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I. INTRODUCTION 
As 2011 dawned, California faced a monumental budget deficit.1 On January 
10, Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. implored the state legislature to address the 
shortfall by enacting a large-scale budgetary realignment.2 Budgetary 
realignments operate by “shifting authority, responsibility, and money for many 
programs from state agencies to counties and sometimes cities or local districts.”3 
Interestingly, Governor Brown’s proposal embodied what may be termed a 
“corrections realignment” component.4 It called on the legislature to transfer 
certain costly state corrections responsibilities (namely, felon management 
duties) to counties.5 In effect, corrections realignment would place certain 
prisoners, of whom, up to that point, had been state prisoners under county 
control. The governor predicted that a realignment of the state’s felon 
management responsibilities would reduce California’s high corrections 
expenditures and help alleviate the state’s fiscal woes.6 
While the governor and the legislature were working to close the budget gap, 
California was in the midst of waging a major legal battle. In 2009, a federal 
court had ordered California to reduce overcrowding in its prisons to cure 
unconstitutional prisoner healthcare defects,7 and the State had appealed the order 
to the United States Supreme Court.8 The Court heard oral arguments in late 2010 
and was in the midst of deliberations when Governor Brown first unveiled his 
budgetary realignment plan.9 Ultimately, five of the nine Supreme Court Justices 
affirmed the prison population reduction order.10 On the same day the Court 
issued its opinion, Governor Brown suggested the corrections realignment 
embodied in his budgetary realignment proposal would help California satisfy the 
 
1. See EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., GOVERNOR, CAL. STATE, 2011–12 GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY 4 
(2011), available at http://www.dof.ca.gov/budget/historical/2011-12/governors/summary/documents/2011-12_ 
Budget_Summary-State_of_California.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (projecting California’s 
2011–12 budget to have a $25.4 billion deficit). 
2. See discussion infra Part III.A.2 (noting Governor Brown’s recommendation of a budgetary 
realignment to the California State Legislature).  
3. DEAN MISCZYNSKI, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., RETHINKING THE STATE-LOCAL RELATIONSHIP: 
CORRECTIONS 6 (2011). 
4. See discussion infra Part III.A.3 (noting the 2011 budgetary realignment proposal contained a 
corrections realignment aspect). 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 70–73 (describing the corrections realignment component of the 
budgetary realignment plan as a cost-savings measure). 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 74–76 (discussing why and to what degree Governor Brown 
anticipated corrections realignment to generate savings for California). 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 105–08 (discussing the federal court’s prison population reduction 
order). 
8. See infra text accompanying note 109 (noting California’s appeal to the Supreme Court and the 
Court’s grant of certiorari). 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 117–19 (noting the timeframe for the Supreme Court’s 
deliberations on the federal court order relative to Governor Brown’s unveiling of budgetary realignment). 
10. See infra text accompanying note 110 (noting that the Supreme Court’s holding was 5–4). 
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order (because it would have the effect of rerouting flows of inmates from state 
prisons to county jails).11  
The main body of this article focuses primarily on the motivations behind 
and consequences of the 2011 corrections realignment. Part II gives readers a 
brief overview of the legislation. Part III examines the legislation’s fiscal and 
legal impetuses in detail. Part IV considers corrections realignment’s likely 
effects and possible adverse consequences. Part V offers closing remarks.  
Appendices A through C are concerned primarily with supplying a legal 
background for the 2011 corrections realignment legislation’s statutory changes 
and then summarizing those changes. Appendices A through C are organized 
topically, with Appendix A discussing California’s felon incarceration laws prior 
and subsequent to corrections realignment, Appendix B discussing California’s 
post-release supervision laws before and after corrections realignment, and 
Appendix C discussing California’s early release laws prior and subsequent to 
corrections realignment. Appendix D provides summary tables of the statutory 
code sections affected by California’s 2011 corrections realignment legislation. 
II. THE 2011 CORRECTIONS REALIGNMENT IN BRIEF12 
At its core, corrections realignment is about defining which level of 
government is responsible for managing California’s felons—the state or the 
counties. With that in mind, it is useful to know what distinguishes felons from 
other criminal offenders. The answer, of course, is that felons are persons who 
have been convicted of at least one felony. But that begs the question, what is a 
felony? California law distinguishes types of crimes by the comparative 
harshness of their penalties.13 Felonies are those crimes which prescribe the 
stiffest penalties. By statute, a felony is any crime whose minimum (or only) 
prescribed sentence exceeds one year of incarceration (every crime prescribing a 
lesser term of imprisonment or a fine, or some combination of a lesser term and a 
fine, is a misdemeanor or an infraction).14 In essence, then, corrections 
realignment defines who is responsible for overseeing criminals whose minimum 
sentences exceed one year of imprisonment. 
Part II.A explains that, before corrections realignment, the state had the 
responsibility to perform incarceration, post-release supervision, and parole 
 
11. See infra text accompanying notes 123–25 (noting Governor Brown publicly contemplated 
corrections realignment as a prison overcrowding reduction measure on the same day the Supreme Court 
affirmed the federal court order). 
12. Before delving into the causes and likely consequences of corrections realignment, readers would 
benefit from having a working knowledge of legislation’s functions. This section aims to provide a general 
sense of the scope and operation of the 2011 corrections realignment. For a more thorough discussion of the 
legislation and its statutory enactments and amendments, see discussion infra Appendices A–C.  
13. See infra note 169 (providing California’s punishment-based statutory definitions for crimes). 
14. See infra note 169 and accompanying text (providing statutory definitions for felonies, 
misdemeanors, and infractions). 
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revocation functions for each felon serving an executed sentence. For reasons 
that will be discussed in Part III, infra, the legislature enacted corrections 
realignment in early 2011 at Governor Brown’s urging. Under the legislation, the 
state government passed key felon-management responsibilities to county 
governments. Part II.B indicates the degree to which counties now partake in the 
incarceration and supervision of felons serving executed sentences. 
A. California’s Felon Management Landscape Before Corrections Realignment  
Before corrections realignment, the state’s responsibility to manage felons 
was fairly comprehensive. The state incarcerated every felon serving an executed 
sentence because state law required every felony sentence to be executed, if at 
all, in a state prison.15 The state’s felon management responsibility also included 
post-release supervision because the law required all felons “released from . . . 
prison [to] spen[d] time . . . in state-supervised parole.”16 Finally, the state’s 
responsibility included a potential incarceration function for every felon on 
parole because parolees who “violated the rules of their parole[] or 
committed . . . new crime[s] . . . could be arrested . . . and sent back to 
prison . . . .”17  
B. California’s Felon Management Landscape After Corrections Realignment  
In post-realignment California, the state and the counties share the 
responsibility of managing felons to a greater extent than before. Corrections 
realignment became law in early 2011 when the California Legislature enacted 
and Governor Brown signed Assembly Bill (AB) 109.18 AB 109 and its follow-up 
 
15. See infra note 170 (indicating why, prior to corrections realignment, felony sentences could be 
executed only in state prisons). Note that state prisons did not incarcerate all convicted felons but only felons 
serving executed sentences. The reason is state law frequently affords sentencing judges the ability to suspend a 
felon’s executed sentence and impose an alternative sentencing disposition such as probation. For a discussion 
of alternative sentencing dispositions and California’s statutory definition of probation, see infra note 188 and 
accompanying text. State trial judges have regularly suspended felons’ prison sentences and imposed an 
alternative sentencing disposition. See MAC TAYLOR, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., ACHIEVING BETTER 
OUTCOMES FOR ADULT PROBATION 6 (2009), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/2009/crim/probation/ 
probation_052909.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“[A]lmost three-quarters of adult felon 
offenders convicted in California in 2007 . . . were actually sentenced to probation or a combination of 
probation and jail.”); MISCZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 12 (“In the 2009–10 fiscal year, about 323,000 people were 
on probation in California, with 249,000 for felony convictions.”). 
16. MISCZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 14. In general, “Parolees had to report to a state parole agent when 
they returned to their communities and were subject to rules (such as no guns, no association with gang 
members), drug tests and other inspections, and searches without search warrants.” Id. at 11. 
17. Id. at 14.  
18. 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 15; see also Senate Floor Vote of AB 109, Unofficial Ballot (Mar. 17, 2011), 
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_0101-0150/ab_109_vote_20110317_0334PM_sen_floor.html (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting the Senate approved AB 109 by a 24-to-16 vote on March 17, 
2011); Assembly Floor Vote of AB 109, Unofficial Ballot (Mar. 17, 2011), http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-
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bills19 (“corrections realignment legislation”)20 essentially sorted felons into three 
groups based on the legislatively determined seriousness of their crimes (low-
level, mid-level, or high-level) and required counties to exercise certain felon-
management functions for each group. The legislation set the respective state and 
county shares of responsibility over the groups of felons on a sliding-scale basis. 
In essence, corrections realignment used the legislatively determined seriousness 
of any particular group’s crimes as a proxy for its amenability to county control 
(in other words, its manageability) and apportioned felon management functions 
to counties accordingly.21 As a result, felons whose crimes are the most serious 
are treated as the least amenable to county control and left predominantly to state 
control, while felons whose crimes are less serious are considered more 
manageable and placed under significant (or complete) county control. 
1. Counties Exercise Complete Control over “Low-Level” Felons 
For the purposes of corrections realignment, a felon whose commitment 
offense is non-violent, non-serious, and non-sexual, and who also has no prior 
convictions for any serious, violent, or sexual crime, is a “low-level” felon.22 The 
                                                                                                                         
12/bill/asm/ab_0101-0150/ab_109_vote_20110317_0532PM_asm_floor.html (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (reporting the Assembly approved AB 109 by a 51-to-27 vote on March 17, 2011); Signing Message 
from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Cal. Gov., to the Members of the Cal. State Assembly (Apr. 5, 2011) [hereinafter 
AB 109 Signing Message] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (signing AB 109 into law).  
19. AB 109 was the main legislative instrument effectuating the 2011 corrections realignment. Compare 
SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 109 (Mar. 17, 2011) (summarizing AB 109’s key 
changes to existing law), with BROWN, supra note 1, at 22–24 (summarizing the governor’s corrections 
realignment proposal). Four additional bills—AB 117, AB 118, AB 116, and AB 17 (First Extraordinary 
Session)—enacted technical revisions and AB 109’s funding mechanisms. See 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 39 (codifying 
AB 117); 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 40 (codifying AB 118); 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 136 (codifying AB 116); 2011–12 1st 
Ex. Sess. ch. 12 (codifying AB 17 (First Extraordinary Session)). See generally SENATE COMMITTEE ON 
BUDGET AND FISCAL REVIEW, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 117, at 1 (Apr. 11, 2011) (explaining that AB 117 
fixed errors contained in AB 109); SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 118, at 2 (June 
28, 2011) (explaining that AB 118 implemented AB 109’s funding mechanisms); SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, 
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 116, at 1 (June 9, 2011) (explaining that AB 116 “contain[ed] provisions 
necessary to implement the 2011–12 budget”); SENATE COMMITTEE ON BUDGET AND FISCAL REVIEW, 
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF ABX1 17, at 1 (Sept. 2, 2011) (explaining that ABX1 17 made “substantive and 
technical changes relevant to AB 109”).  
20. AB 109 was formally titled “the 2011 Realignment Legislation addressing public safety.” 2011 Cal. 
Stat. ch. 15, § 1, at 7. However, this article uses the label “corrections realignment legislation” (rather than 
“public safety realignment legislation” or some variation thereof) to refer to AB 109 and its follow-ups because 
this article is concerned only with the felon management changes occasioned by those bills, changes 
distinguishable from any other “public safety” ones by virtue of their correctional nature. 
21. See infra text accompanying notes 23 and 27 (suggesting the relationship of county control to felon 
manageability implicit in corrections realignment).  
22. See BROWN, supra note 1, at 23 (using the terms “short-term, lower‑level offenders,” “low‑level 
offenders,” and “short‑term offenders” interchangeably to refer to “offenders without any current or prior 
serious or violent or sex convictions”). See generally id. at 131 (explaining that the low-level label applies to 
persons whose commitment offense was a “drug or property” felony rather than a “crime[] against [a] 
person[]”). 
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corrections realignment legislation operates from the position that these felons 
“are . . . sufficiently manageable and low risk that they can be safely held in 
county jail and managed by county sheriffs”23 because it assigned the counties 
total responsibility to manage them. Specifically, the realignment provisions 
require each low-level felon sentenced on or after October 1, 2011, to serve his or 
her executed sentence either entirely in county jail or split between county jail 
and county probation.24 What this means is that, from October 1, 2011 onward, 
corrections realignment completely rerouted the flow of low-level inmates from 
state prisons to county jails.   
2. Counties Supervise “Mid-Level” Felons upon Release from Prison 
For the purposes of corrections realignment, a felon who is not low-level but 
whose commitment offense is neither serious nor violent is a “mid-level” felon.25 
The corrections realignment legislation did not reroute their flow to jails; the 
state retained the duty to incarcerate these individuals.26 However, the legislation 
operates from the position that felons “at the mid-level” are “not high-level 
enough to warrant state parole supervision”27 and requires counties, not the state 
government, to supervise all such felons released from prison on or after October 
1, 2011.28  
 
23. MISCZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 13. 
24. See discussion infra Appendix A (discussing felony sentencing to county jail). Corrections 
realignment marked “the first time in California’s history that . . . executed felony sentences [are] served in 
county jails . . . .” GARRICK BYERS, REALIGNMENT 16 (Dec. 3, 2011 ed.) (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). Because felonies are the only crimes whose minimum sentences exceed one year, see infra note 169 
and accompanying text (defining felonies), corrections realignment also marked first time “county jail sentences 
[may exceed one year] . . . for a single offense . . . .” BYERS, supra, at 16. State attorneys and judges have 
referred to county jails as “county prisons” to reflect their felon incarceration function. E-mail from Samuel T. 
McAdam, Judge, Yolo County Superior Court, to author (Nov. 14, 2012, 07:40 PST) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). But see MISCZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 14 “[C]ounties . . . handle these [felons] 
differently than the state [did] . . . . Counties . . . use alternative sanctions . . . less costly than lock-up time.”). 
25. See BYERS, supra note 24, at 15 (distinguishing “mid-level” felons from low-level and high-level 
felons). 
26. See infra text accompanying note 195 (noting corrections realignment precludes all felons but those 
lacking current or prior convictions for serious, violent, and sexual felonies from serving their executed felony 
sentences in county jails). 
27. BYERS, supra note 24, at 15. 
28. See infra text accompanying note 240 (noting corrections realignment places mid-level felons on 
post-release community supervision). County-administered supervision differs from the state-administered 
parole system because counties handle released felons “in a way quite different from the state’s approach. 
Instead of relying primarily on one sanction—return to prison—to punish parole violations,” counties deploy “a 
range of options,” and harsh sanctions “need approval from a court-appointed hearing officer.” MISCZYNSKI, 
supra note 3, at 17.  
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3. Counties Incarcerate “High-Level” Felons Who Violate Their Parole 
Conditions 
For the purposes of corrections realignment, a felon whose commitment 
offense is a serious or violent felony or a third strike offense, or who is a high-
risk sex offender or possesses a mental disorder, is what may be termed a “high-
level” felon.29 Under the legislation, the state government retained significant 
control over high-level felons, incarcerating them in its prisons30 and subjecting 
them to parole supervision after they are released from prison.31 However, the 
corrections realignment legislation transferred a measure of responsibility for 
managing high-level felons to the counties by requiring county jails, rather than 
state prisons, to incarcerate most parole violators.32 In effect, the legislation 
almost completely rerouted the flow of parole violators from prisons to jails. 
III. THE IMPETUSES BEHIND THE 2011 CORRECTIONS REALIGNMENT 
As indicated in Part II, supra, corrections realignment required county jails to 
house low-level felons and parole violators and to supervise mid-level felons 
released from prison. These changes “may [have] be[en] the biggest . . . in 
California[’s] criminal law since Determinate Sentencing replaced Indeterminate 
Sentencing in 1978. [Corrections realignment] join[ed] ‘Proposition 8’ in 1982, 
‘Proposition 115’ in 1991, ‘Three Strikes in 1994’, and other large-scale changes 
in dramatically altering California’s criminal law landscape.”33 Changes this 
dramatic do not emerge in a vacuum. To understand why corrections realignment 
became part of California’s criminal law landscape, it is imperative we examine 
closely the context in which the legislation arose and the problems that informed 
its creation.  
Part III examines corrections realignment in light of two impetuses. 
Corrections realignment responded directly to a fiscal crisis, and Part III.A 
indicates how. Corrections realignment also responded to a legal impetus. Part 
III.B considers corrections realignment in light of California’s legal battle over 
prison overcrowding the deleterious prisoner healthcare effects it entails. 
 
29. See BYERS, supra note 24, at 15 (distinguishing “high-level” felons from low-level and mid-level 
felons). 
30. See infra text accompanying note 195 (noting corrections realignment precludes all felons but those 
lacking current or prior convictions for serious, violent, and sexual felonies from serving their executed felony 
sentences in county jails). 
31. See infra text accompanying note 240 (indicating corrections realignment placed only mid-level 
felons on post-release community supervision).  
32. See infra text accompanying notes 258, 269–70 (indicating that most parole violations are 
punishable by only up to six months in a county jail).  
33. GARRICK BYERS, REALIGNMENT: AB 109 7 (June 27, 2011 ed.) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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A. The Fiscal Impetus Behind Corrections Realignment  
Corrections realignment was a budget measure. It was embodied in a 
budgetary realignment and enacted in response to a fiscal crisis. Part III.A 
focuses primarily on the origins of California’s 2011 fiscal crisis and the 
justifications and operation of Governor Brown’s budgetary realignment 
proposal, including its corrections realignment component. More specifically, 
Part III.A.1 examines the dual causes of the 2011 budget crisis, Part III.A.2 
discusses the governor’s proposed solution in some depth, and Part III.A.3 
indicates why the governor’s solution embodied a corrections component. 
1. A Financial Crisis  
a. Dual Causes: The Great Recession Plus a Structural Deficit 
 California faced a $25.4 billion budget deficit when 2011 began.34 In his 
January 10th budget summary,35 Governor Brown attributed California’s financial 
woes to a number of factors.36 Of those factors, the most significant one was the 
revenue loss occasioned by the Great Recession.37 The Great Recession was “a 
financial crisis instigated by risky financial activity  that . . . [caused] the housing 
bubble” to burst.38 From the official beginning of the Great Recession in 
December 2007 to its official end in June 2009,39 “all of [California’s] major 
revenues sources”
40
—its “personal income tax, sales tax, and corporation 
taxes”41—fell significantly,42 causing California’s budget revenues to decline by 
 
34. See BROWN, supra note 1 (reporting the projected scope of the 2011 budget gap). 
35. See generally id. app. at 67 (defining “Governor’s Budget Summary” as “[a] companion publication 
to the Governor’s Budget that outlines the Governor’s policies, goals, and objectives for the budget year. It 
provides a perspective on significant fiscal and/or structural proposals.”). 
36. See id. at 4–5 (defining the budget deficit). 
37. Id. at 2.  
38. Id. at 29. See generally R. Christopher Whalen, The Subprime Crisis—Cause, Effect, and 
Consequences, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 219 (2008) (discussing the Great Recession’s 
causes); Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 24 REV. FIN. 
STUDIES 1848 (2011) (discussing the Great Recession’s causes). The recession cost the nation about “eight 
million jobs,” BROWN, supra note 1, at 31, and some “$11 trillion in assets—nearly a year’s worth of . . . 
economic output.” Id. at 30. 
39. Business Cycle Dating Committee, National Bureau of Economic Research, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. 
RESEARCH (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.html (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). 
40. BLUE SKY CONSULTING GRP., CALIFORNIA’S BUDGET CRISIS 6 (2009), available at http://www. 
blueshieldcafoundation.org/sites/default/files/publications/downloadable/10_2008_californias_budget_crisis_0.
pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
41. BROWN, supra note 1, app. at 67. 
42. BLUE SKY CONSULTING GRP., supra note 40, at 6. For example, because California experienced its 
“worst job losses on record” during the Great Recession, “losing nearly a million nonfarm jobs,” its “personal 
income fell over $38 billion” in 2009. BROWN, supra note 1, at 33. 
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about a quarter “from the height of revenues in 2007–08 to the bottom in 2009–
10.”43 “Although the economic downturn . . . [was] the chief contributor to [the] 
budget gap,” Governor Brown observed, “California [also] entered the recession 
with an existing structural budget deficit, meaning . . . revenues did not cover 
costs.”44 
b. A Grim Outlook 
In 2010, California’s economy recovered modestly from the revenue losses 
wrought by the Great Recession.45 Governor Brown cautioned, however, the 
state’s “[b]aseline revenues [would] not return to the [pre-Great Recession] level 
until 2013–14 and, even then, projected revenues [would] be insufficient to pay 
for program services . . . the state [was] committed to provide.”46 Moreover, 
although California had enacted some “$103.6 billion in budgetary actions . . . 
between 2008 and 2010,”47 most of them “were temporary or [they] failed 
because of court challenges or faulty assumptions”; in short, they had not closed 
California’s structural budget deficit.48 According to the governor, “[w]ithout 
 
43. BROWN, supra note 1, at 1. 
44. Id. at 2. See generally What Is a Structural Budget Deficit?, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CAL., 
http://ca.lwv.org/lwvc/action/budget/SLF_budget_deficit.pdf (last visited June 15, 2012) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (defining a “structural budget deficit” as the situation that exists when, under “the 
current revenue structure (e.g., taxes, fees, and other sources), the state has insufficient income to maintain 
services at the current level”). The structural budget deficit began around the turn of the twenty-first century: 
In 1998–99, the state’s budget was balanced and projected to remain in balance. . . . [O]ne year later, 
revenues increased by 23 percent, due to a stock market and dot–com boom that drove 
unprecedented increases in stock option and capital gains income. . . . The [revenue] surge 
[prompted the state government to undertake] massive—and unsustainable—new spending 
commitments. When revenues declined, the state relied mostly on one–time measures . . . to 
temporarily reduce spending without cutting back underlying program commitments. Thus, the 
structural deficit was born. 
ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, GOVERNOR, CAL. STATE, 2009–10 GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY 1 (2009), 
available at http://www.dof.ca.gov/budget/historical/2009-10/governors/summary/documents/FullBudgetSumm 
ary.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). From about 2004 to 2007, California’s budget had an 
“imbalance of roughly $6 to $8 billion between ongoing spending and revenues.” BLUE SKY CONSULTING GRP., 
supra note 40, at 4. When revenues increased again, “from $76.8 billion in 2003–04 to $102.5 billion in 2007–
08,” id., the state government used much of that growth “to repay loans and backfill for the loss of temporary 
cost-saving steps” rather than to remedy the structural deficit. SCHWARZENEGGER, supra, at 2. 
45. See BROWN, supra note 1, at 32–34 (reporting California’s vehicle sales, home building, housing 
prices, taxable sales, and exports rebounded somewhat in 2010 from their Great Recession levels). 
46. Id. at 1. The governor explained, “economic recoveries following recessions caused by financial 
crises are slower and more drawn out than those stemming from other causes.” Id. at 29. See generally id. at 32 
(“[T]he unemployment rate often remains high after employment begins to recover[ is] because . . . hiring 
usually lags behind output during the early stages of a recovery. . . . [F]irms tend to increase output first by 
boosting productivity and by raising the number of hours worked by existing employees. Hiring . . . tends to 
occur later.”). 
47. Id. 
48. Id. Seventy-five percent of the $24.3 billion in budget solutions enacted in the 2008–09 fiscal year, 
84 percent of the $60 billion in budget solutions enacted in the 2009–10 fiscal year, and 85 percent of the $19.3 
billion in budget solutions enacted in the 2010–11 fiscal year, were temporary or failed. Id. at 2. 
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corrective action, . . . the structural deficit [would] persist and grow to between 
$17.2 billion and $21.5 billion per year through 2014–15.”49  
2. The Governor’s Solution: A Vast Budgetary Realignment   
a. Proposing Budgetary Realignment  
Governor Brown recommended the state legislature balance the budget 
principally through traditional budget-solving measures, such as spending cuts 
and borrowing.50 However, he also intimated to the legislature that traditional 
solutions without more would be insufficient to “balance the budget [in the 
2011–12 budget year] and into the future, and to provide for a reserve.”51 He said 
the Great Recession’s effects on California’s revenues had left “state and local 
governments . . . [with in]sufficient resources to fund all program demands,” and, 
“[a]bsent long-term change, government [would] eventually [have] to shift funds 
from other important programs, including public safety, to pay for rising pension 
and health care costs.”52 Accordingly, he urged the state legislature to enact a 
budgetary realignment (in the governor’s words, “a vast . . . realignment of 
government services”) that would “revers[e California’s] 30-year trend . . . [of 
transferring] decision-making and budget authority . . . from local government[s] 
to the State Capitol.”53  
b. Justifying Budgetary Realignment  
When Governor Brown spoke of “a 30-year trend,”54 he was referring to the 
fact that the state legislature had assumed programmatic authority from local 
governments beginning in the 1970s,55 and, in the three-plus decades that 
 
49. Id. at 2. See generally id. at 3 (projecting the state’s “Operating Deficit without Corrective Actions” 
to be $19.2 billion in 2012–13, $17.4 billion in 2013–14, and $21.5 billion in 2014–15). 
50. See id. at 5–6 (proposing $12.5 billion in spending cuts and $8.2 billion in one-time solutions such as 
“borrowing from special funds” and “property tax shifts”).  
51. Id. at 5. 
52. Id. at 15. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. According to the governor, “Two major events began the shift of government responsibility in 
California from local governments to the state level. . . . First, the California Supreme Court in 1971 ruled that 
K-12 education is a fundamental constitutional right [and] . . . found that wealth-related disparities in per-pupil 
spending generated by the state’s education finance system violated the equal protection clause of the state 
Constitution.” Id. at 16. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 11 (repealed 1974) (“All laws of a 
general nature shall have a uniform operation.”); id. § 21 (repealed 1974) (“No special privileges or immunities 
shall ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or 
class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all 
citizens.”); Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971) (holding California’s public 
school finance system had violated federal and state equal protection clauses); Dep’t of Mental Hygiene v. 
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followed, had routinely shifted “revenue . . . and program responsibilities 
between the state and counties.”56 According to the governor, the “numerous 
shifts back and forth between the state and local government”57 created program 
duplication at the different levels of government, ultimately “blurring 
[governmental] responsibility and [increasing] program costs.”58 The governor 
asserted that, by “untangl[ing] this knot and reduc[ing] duplication by providing 
services at one level of government[] to the extent possible,”59 a budgetary 
                                                                                                                         
Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 588, 400 P.2d 321, 322 (1965) (construing CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 21 to be 
“substantially the equivalent” of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause). “This decision had 
significant fiscal ramifications, as state government assumed responsibility for equalizing school funding.” 
BROWN, supra note 1, at 16. See generally Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 18 Cal. 3d 728, 741–42, 557 P.2d 929, 
935 (1976) (ordering California to equalize per pupil expenditures); 1972 Cal. Stat. ch. 1406 (enacting 
provisions to equalize California’s per pupil expenditures). Then, “[a]n even more dramatic transfer of power to 
the state government occurred in 1978 when voters adopted Proposition 13.” BROWN, supra note 1, at 16. See 
generally Cal. Proposition 13 (1978) (enacting the “People’s Initiative to Limit Property Taxation”). Before 
Proposition 13,  
local entities set the property tax rate for their jurisdiction, based on policy and funding decisions 
made primarily at the local level. Locally elected assessors determined the assessed value of 
property. . . . Proposition 13 limited the property tax rate to 1 percent of assessed value, except for 
pre-existing debt. The assessed value of property was set at the 1975–76 base year, changing only 
when property is sold or new construction is completed. The property is then reassessed based on 
“fair market value”, which is generally [its] purchase price . . . . A property’s base year value may be 
increased by inflation, not to exceed 2 percent per year.  
BROWN, supra note 1, at 16–17. See generally CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §§ 1–4 (codifying Proposition 13’s 
changes). About one month before Proposition 13 passed, the Legislative Analyst’s Office predicted the 
initiative would cost local governments “$7 billion in property tax revenues,” some fifty-seven percent of their 
property tax revenues—and twenty-two percent of their aggregate revenues—in the 1978–79 fiscal year. 
Sonoma Cnty. Org. of Pub. Emps. v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296, 309–10, 591 P.2d 1, 8 (1979). Absent 
corrective action, local governments would likely have had to cut programs and lay off about 270,000 
employees to compensate for the lost property tax revenues. Id. at 310, 591 P.2d at 8. As Governor Brown 
observed, the state government  
used its budget surplus to . . . “bail out” local governments for the 1978–79 fiscal year. The bail-out 
consisted of allocations to local jurisdictions to make up for a significant portion of their property tax 
loss. As part of the bail-out to counties, the state either assumed responsibility for programs or took 
on new funding obligations. For instance, the state assumed the county share of Medi-Cal and 
SSI/SSP and increased its share of funding for foster care. 
BROWN, supra note 1, at 17. See generally 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 292 (enacting the government bail-out). Then, in 
1979, the state government enacted “a long-term financing mechanism . . . that essentially mirrored the one-year 
bail-out. [It reallocated p]roperty tax . . . from K–14 schools to cities, counties, and special districts to make up 
a significant portion of the loss of property tax, and the state [government] assumed a greater share of funding 
for schools and some health and human services programs.” BROWN, supra note 1, at 17. See generally 1979 
Cal. Stat. ch. 282 (enacting the long-term financing mechanism).  
56. BROWN, supra note 1, at 18. See generally id. at 17–18 (listing “[t]he most salient” programmatic 
and revenue transfers to occur between 1979 and 2011). For examples of the “numerous shifts back and forth 
between the state and local government,” id. at 17, see 1982 Cal. Stat. chs. 328, 1594 (shifting Medi-Cal to the 
counties); 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 945 (shifting trial court funding to the state government). 
57. BROWN, supra note 1, at 17. 
58. Id. at 18. 
59. Id.  
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realignment would shrink the state government’s administrative costs60 and 
staffing needs.61 
c. Implementing Budgetary Realignment  
In its conception, Governor Brown contemplated budgetary realignment as 
comprising two steps: first, determining which level of government (state or 
local) could “best and most cost-effectively . . . deliver[]” a program; and, 
second, “provid[ing] a permanent funding source” to that level of government to 
pay for the costs of delivering the program.62 Governor Brown advocated 
implementing budgetary realignment in two phases.63 Phase one, set to begin in 
the 2011–12 fiscal year, would transfer “$5.9 billion . . . of [public safety] 
programs from the state to the counties . . . .”64 Phase two, set to begin after 2011, 
would incorporate statutory changes related to the “[i]mplementation of national 
health care reform . . . .”65 Once fully phased in, the realignment would 
“restructure how and where more than $10 billion in a wide range of services are 
delivered.”66 The governor conceded, “A [budgetary] realignment of this 
magnitude raises significant issues.”67 However, he also admonished, “absent this 
kind of change[,] many essential programs, including education and public 
safety, [would] suffer extensive reductions.”68  
3. The Corrections Component of the Governor’s Solution 
Governor Brown’s budgetary realignment embodied a corrections 
component. When the governor tabbed various public safety services for phase 
one of budgetary realignment, he focused in particular on shifting key state 
government felon management duties to counties.69 As of early 2011, 
incarcerating and supervising all felons with executed sentences was costing the 
 
60. Id. at 7.  
61. Id. at 16.  
62. Id.  
63. See generally id. at 19–28 (outlining the two phases of the 2011 budgetary realignment plan). 
64. Id. at 6; see also id. at 19 (noting phase one programs “fall broadly into the category of public 
safety”).  
65. Id. at 28. See generally id. (providing that, under phase two, “the state will become responsible for 
costs associated with health care programs, including California Children’s Services and In‑Home Supportive 
Services, while the counties [will] assume responsibility for CalWORKs, food stamp administration, . . . child 
support” and “child care programs”). 
66. Id. at 6, 18. 
67. Id. at 16. 
68. Id.  
69. See id. at 22–24 (presenting the 2011 corrections realignment).  
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state a sizeable fortune.70 Cognizant of that, and clearly aware counties can 
manage felons at a lower cost than the state government can,71 Governor Brown 
urged the state legislature to undertake a corrections realignment and place all but 
“the most serious and violent felony offenders” under some measure of county 
control.72 He advocated, inter alia, requiring counties to incarcerate low-level 
felons and parole violators and to supervise released mid-level felons.73 The 
legislature took the governor’s advice and gave legal effect to his proposal by 
enacting the legislation described in Part II.B, supra.  
The governor contemplated that the state government would perpetually 
reimburse counties for the costs of corrections realignment.74 In other words, he 
intended the state to pay counties to house low-level felons and parole violators 
and to supervise mid-level felons upon their release from prison. At first blush, 
paying one level of government to perform what had until that point been another 
government level’s functions may seem like an odd way to generate savings, 
especially when those payments are to last into perpetuity. But, as indicated 
 
70. Governor Brown projected California’s 2011–12 budget year corrections expenditures to total 
approximately $9 billion, roughly ten percent of the state’s budget. Id. at 14. See generally MARK LENO, 
SENATE COMMITTEE ON BUDGET AND FISCAL REVIEW, FINAL ACTION REPORT: A SUMMARY OF THE 2011 
BUDGET ACT CHAPTER 33, STATUTES OF 2011, at 1 (2011), available at http://sbud.senate.ca.gov/sites/sbud. 
senate.ca.gov/files/FAR/FinalActionReport2011.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (projecting all 
state budgetary expenditures for the 2011–12 budget year to total $85.9 billion). The high cost was hardly 
surprising given that, as of 2011, “California operate[d] 33 adult prisons, 42 incarceration camps, and 13 
Community Correctional Facilities. . . . The state plan[ned] to . . . authorize 62,000 employees to run these 
facilities in 2011–12.” MISCZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 8. See generally id. (“Camps are lower security facilities, 
usually in rural areas, for lower level offenders. Community Correctional Facilities are run by cities or counties, 
house parole violators and low security inmates, and typically provide more educational and rehabilitative 
programming than prisons.”). The high projected corrections cost was consistent with prior years’ totals. See 
ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, GOVERNOR, CAL. STATE, 2008–09 GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY 20 (2008), 
available at http://www.dof.ca.gov/budget/historical/2008-09/governors/summary/documents/BSUM.pdf (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting California’s 2007–08 corrections expenditures to be $10.1 
billion); SCHWARZENEGGER, supra note 44, at 18 (reporting California’s 2008–09 corrections expenditures to 
be $9.685 billion); ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, GOVERNOR, CAL. STATE, 2010–11 GOVERNOR’S BUDGET 
SUMMARY 13 (2010), available at http://www.dof.ca.gov/budget/historical/2010-11/governors/summary/ 
documents/FullBudgetSummary.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting California’s 2009–10 
corrections expenditures to be $8.16 billion). 
71. As of early 2011, incarcerating a person in a county jail for one year cost roughly one-half the 
amount of money required to incarcerate a person in a state prison for one year. See Letter from Diane M. 
Cummins, Special Advisor to the Governor, State and Local Realignment, Cal. Dep’t of Fin., to Bob 
Blumenfield, Chair, Conference Comm., and Mark Leno, Vice Chair, Conference Comm. (Feb. 25, 2011) (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (indicating that incarcerating a person in a jail cell cost approximately 
$25,000 per year); MAC TAYLOR, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., CAL FACTS 55 (2011), available at 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2011/calfacts/calfacts_010511.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“In 
2009–10, the average cost to incarcerate an inmate in state prison was about $46,700.”). The comparatively high 
cost of prison incarceration owed primarily “to security and inmate health care” costs. TAYLOR, supra, at 55. 
72. BROWN, supra note 1, at 19–20.  
73. See id. at 22–24 (outlining the governor’s felon management realignment proposals).  
74. Id. at 26–27 (indicating corrections realignment would “rel[y] on maintaining current tax rates for 
five years” and “[w]hen these taxes expire after five years, the state [government] will provide counties an 
amount equal to what these [tax rates] will generate”). 
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above, counties can manage felons at a lower cost than the state government can, 
and, under corrections realignment, the state would be paying incarceration and 
supervision costs at county rates rather than at their comparatively higher state 
rates. Moreover, Governor Brown knew that the number of felons to be realigned 
to county control figured to be quite large.75 For those reasons, he estimated that a 
fully funded corrections realignment would help the state government to realize 
savings growing to $1.4 billion in the 2014–15 fiscal year.76  
B. The Legal Impetus Behind Corrections Realignment  
Corrections realignment was a budget measure. It was embodied in a 
budgetary realignment and enacted in response to a fiscal crisis. However, 
according to the Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO),77 “The 2011 realignment 
was [also] undertaken . . . to [enable California to] comply with a federal court 
order to reduce overcrowding in the state’s 33 prisons to no more than 137.5 
percent of the[ir] design capacity by June 2013.”78 Because it essentially redirects 
flow of low-level felons and parole violators from state prisons to county jails, 
corrections realignment’s potential to reduce the state’s prison overcrowding 
must have been clear, if not at the moment of its conception, then fairly early in 
its development.  
Part III.B focuses primarily on the development of California’s legal impetus 
to reduce overcrowding in its prisons. Part III.B.1 notes how overcrowding in 
California’s prisons generated deficiencies in prisoners’ healthcare. Part III.B.2 
discusses how those healthcare deficiencies became the subject of two class-
action lawsuits and explores the executive, legislative, and judicial remedies 
flowing from those suits, including the prison overcrowding reduction order and 
the United States Supreme Court’s review thereof. Part III.B.3 indicates how and 
when Governor Brown implicated the corrections realignment legislation as a 
solution to the state’s prison overcrowding problem. 
 
75. See id. at 131 (“Lower‑level offenders currently represent almost half of the prison population on 
any given day.”); id. (“The state . . . devotes a large share of its prison resources to short‑term incarcerations of 
parole violators.”).  
76. Id. 
77. See generally id. app. at 68 (defining the Legislative Analyst’s Office as “[a] non-partisan 
organization that provides advice to the Legislature on fiscal and policy matters”). 
78. MAC TAYLOR, THE 2012–13 BUDGET: REFOCUSING CDCR AFTER THE 2011 REALIGNMENT, CAL. 
LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. 3 (2012), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis/2012/crim_justice/cdcr-
022312.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).  
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1. Severe Prison Overcrowding and the Resultant Healthcare Deficiencies  
California’s history of prison overcrowding is long. The state’s prisoner 
population has exceeded its prison system’s design capacity79 since roughly the 
time San Quentin, California’s first prison, started operations.80 While the state 
has adopted various measures throughout its history aimed, at least in part, at 
reducing the extent of California’s prisoner population,81 those measures did not 
prevent California’s prisons from becoming so severely overcrowded that they 
developed “a [deficient] state of medical care.”82 The California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), the agency that runs California’s prison 
system,83 provides medical84 and mental85 healthcare facilities and services to state 
 
79. See id. at 8 (“Design capacity generally refers to the number of beds that [the state] would operate if 
it housed only one inmate per cell in its 33 prisons, and did not use temporary beds, such as housing inmates in 
gyms.”). 
80. According to Ms. Kara Dansky of the Stanford Criminal Justice Center,  
[C]onstruction began on San Quentin prison [in 1852] . . . . Until San Quentin was built, all of 
California’s prisoners were held either on a ship called The Waban, docked in the San Francisco 
Bay, or in the San Francisco city jail. . . . San Quentin’s population grew quickly in the early years, 
and by 1858, there were close to 600 prisoners being held in an institution that had only sixty-two 
cells.  
Kara Dansky, Understanding California Sentencing, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 45, 53 (2008).  
81. For example, in 1903, the state legislature enacted California’s first probation law, “permitting 
courts to place defendants on probation rather than sentence them to prison.” Dansky, supra note 80, at 56; see 
also 1903 Cal. Stat. ch. 34 (enacting California’s probation system). For California’s statutory definition of 
probation, see infra note 188. Shortly after the state adopted its first probation law, “California’s governors 
began to argue in favor of expanding [California’s] parole system as a mechanism to relieve overcrowding,” 
and the state’s Board of Prison Directors complied. Dansky, supra note 80, at 58–59. For a judicial definition of 
parole, see infra note 205. According to Ms. Dansky,  
Between 1890 and 1900 the prison population rose by 73 inmates; between 1900 and 1906 the 
population rose by another 503 inmates. . . . [T]he Board of Prison Directors . . . rapidly increase[ed] 
parole grants. 
Between 1907 and 1909, the rate of release on parole tripled and by 1914 there were almost as many 
inmates being paroled as there were inmates discharged at the expiration of their terms. During this 
period, the application process was simplified and the decision making process was more 
streamlined. Between 1893 and 1916, California’s executive branch used parole openly, deliberately, 
and extensively as a mechanism for reducing prison overcrowding by releasing offenders whose 
determinate sentences (legislatively fixed and judicially imposed) had yet to expire. 
Dansky, supra note 80, at 59. Then, in 1965, the state legislature incentivized increased probation rates by 
enact[ing] the California Probation Subsidy Act . . . . This Act provided counties a maximum of 
$4,000 for each adult or juvenile offender not committed to state prison (above historical 
commitment levels) . . . . [T]he program was ultimately responsible for the diversion of more than 
45,000 [adult and juvenile] offenders from state institutions to local probation and rehabilitation-
oriented programs.  
Id. at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
82. Sherry Colb, Massive Prison Release and Least Restrictive Alternatives, DORF ON L. (Dec. 22, 
2010), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2010/12/massive-prison-release-and-least.html (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review).  
83. See generally BROWN, supra note 1, at 127 (“The California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation (CDCR) is responsible for the incarceration of convicted felons.”). 
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prisoners. However, because of severe prison overcrowding, the CDCR’s 
“security staff [has] impose[d] frequent and persistent lockdowns,”86 limiting 
ailing prisoners’ access to those facilities and services.87 Severe prison 
overcrowding has also contributed to staffing shortages in prison medical units88 
and facilitated “the spread of infectious diseases” among prisoners.89  
2. How Two Class-Action Lawsuits Founded on Healthcare Deficiencies in 
California’s Prisons Sparked Executive, Legislative, and Judicial 
Remedies 
a. The Cases: Coleman v. Brown and Plata v. Brown 
In 1990, a class of seriously mentally ill California prisoners sued the State in 
federal district court, claiming prison overcrowding had prevented them from 
receiving constitutionally sufficient mental healthcare services while 
incarcerated.90 In the resulting Coleman v. Brown, the court found the plaintiff 
class had “languished for months, or even years, without access to necessary 
care.”
91
 The court subsequently “appointed a Special Master to oversee 
development and implementation of a remedial plan of action.”92 
                                                                                                                         
84. Each California prison has low-acuity and high-acuity hospital beds. TAYLOR, supra note 78, at 20. 
See generally id. (“Low–acuity hospital beds provide inpatient care to inmates who have complex medical 
problems that require daily nursing care.”); id. (“High–acuity hospital beds are the highest level of inpatient 
care available within CDCR prisons. These beds are for inmates who require nursing care 24 hours a day and 
extensive assistance with daily activities such as bathing and eating.”). Each state prison also has “a medical 
clinic where physicians deliver basic primary care to inmates on an outpatient basis.” Id. 
85. See id. at 23–24 (describing California’s inmate mental health facilities). 
86. Id. at 20. Were it not for prison overcrowding, prisoners would have been  
initially housed in reception centers (usually in cells) upon their admission to [state prison]. After 
which, the [prison would] assign[] inmates to different types of housing based on several factors 
including offense, length of prison sentence, and behavior during current and prior incarcerations. 
Inmates considered low security (classified as Levels I and II) [would] generally [be] housed in 
dorms, while high–security inmates (classified as Levels III and IV) [would] generally [be] housed 
in cells. Female inmates—regardless of classification—[would] often [be] placed in the same 
housing units.  
Id. at 10. However, because of overcrowding, state prisons utilized “nontraditional housing arrangements,” 
holding prisoners “in gymnasiums and dayrooms” that are less secure than traditional dorms and cells (and 
which thus contributed to conditions necessitating lockdowns). Id. at 20. 
87. See id. at 20 (noting lockdowns limit prisoners’ ability to make “medical appointments and receive 
their daily medications”).  
88. See id. at 21 (“[Q]ualified [medical] applicants are often unwilling to work in the stressful 
environment of an overcrowded prison.”). 
89. Id.  
90. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995).  
91. Id. at 1316. 
92. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1926 (2011). See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 450 (3d 
pocket ed. 2006) (defining “special master” as “A master appointed to assist the court with a particular matter or 
case”); id. (defining “master” as “[a] parajudicial officer (such as a referee, an auditor, an examiner, or an 
assessor) specially appointed to help a court with its proceedings” and explaining that “[a] master may take 
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Then, in 2001, a “class of state prisoners with serious medical conditions” 
sued California as well, claiming prison overcrowding had prevented them from 
receiving constitutionally sufficient medical healthcare services.93 In the resulting 
Plata v. Brown, “the State conceded that deficiencies in prison medical care [had] 
violated prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights . . . [and] stipulated to a remedial 
injunction.”94 However, California did not “comply with the injunction, and in 
2005 the [Plata C]ourt appointed a Receiver to oversee remedial efforts.”95 
Not only did matters not improve following Coleman’s and Plata’s 
commencements, California’s prison overcrowding actually worsened, surging 
from 202% of the prison system’s design capacity in June 2001 to 216% in June 
2006.96 Convinced “a remedy for unconstitutional medical and mental health care 
could not be achieved without reducing overcrowding,” the Coleman and Plata 
plaintiffs independently filed motions for the court to reduce the prison 
population under the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act.97 Subsequently, “[t]he 
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit convened a three-judge 
court composed of the Coleman and Plata District Judges and a . . . Ninth Circuit 
Judge” to consider whether to order the state to reduce its prison population.98  
b. Executive and Legislative Remedial Efforts 
Between October 2006 (one month before the Coleman and Plata plaintiffs 
filed their independent motions) and August 2009 (the month the three-judge 
                                                                                                                         
testimony, hear and rule on discovery disputes, enter temporary orders, and handle other pretrial maters, . . . 
usu. with a written report to the court”). 
93. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1926. 
94. Id.  
95. Id. See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 595 (3d pocket ed. 2006) (defining “receiver” as “[a] 
disinterested person appointed by a court . . . for the protection or collection of property that is the subject of 
diverse claims (for example, because it belongs to a bankrupt or is otherwise being litigated)”). 
96. The state’s official prisoner population figure rose from 161,497 to 172,561 in that five-year span. 
CAL. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, SPRING 2010 ADULT POPULATION PROJECTIONS 2010–2015, 
at 39 (2010), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/reports_research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/ 
Projections/S10Pub.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). See generally State Responds to Three-Judge 
Court’s Order Requiring a Reduction in Prison Crowding, CDCR TODAY (June 7, 2011), 
http://cdcrtoday.blogspot.com/2011/06/state-responds-to-three-judge-courts.html (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (calculating the state prison system’s design capacity at 79,858). 
97. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1927–28. The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides, “In any civil action in 
Federal court with respect to prison conditions, a prisoner release order shall be entered only by a three-judge 
court in accordance with section 2284 of title 28.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(B) (2006). See generally 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2284(b)(1) (“Upon the filing of a request for three judges, the judge to whom the request is presented shall . . . 
notify the chief judge of the circuit, who shall designate two other judges, at least one of whom shall be a circuit 
judge. The judges so designated, and the judge to whom the request was presented, shall serve as members of 
the court to hear and determine the action or proceeding.”). “The three-judge court shall enter a prisoner release 
order only if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that crowding is the primary cause of the 
violation of a Federal right,” 18 U.S.C. § 2284(a)(3)(E)(i), and “no other relief will remedy the violation of the 
Federal right.” Id. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(ii).  
98. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1922. 
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panel issued its findings), the state government enacted several new prisoner 
population reduction measures. For example, in October 2006, Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger declared a state of emergency99 and authorized the California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to transfer state prisoners to out-of-
state institutions.100 One year later, in 2007, the state legislature enacted  Section 
15819.40 of the California Government Code,101 which “authorized a total of $7.7 
billion . . . for a broad package of state prison and local jail construction and 
rehabilitation initiatives . . . .”102 And, in 2009, the state legislature enacted a bill 
that “shorten[ed] prison stays[ and] made it harder to return an offender to prison 
for a parole violation.”103  
c. A Judicial Remedy: A Prisoner Population Reduction Order  
The prisoner population reduction measures adopted between late 2006 and 
late 2009 had perceptible effects: after the state’s prison population peaked at 
approximately 217% of design capacity in June 2007, it subsequently dropped to 
 
99. CA.GOV, PRISON OVERCROWDING STATE OF EMERGENCY PROCLAMATION (Oct. 4, 2006), available 
at http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=4278 [hereinafter PRISON OVERCROWDING PROCLAMATION] (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review); see also id. (“[A]ll 33 [state] prisons are now at or above maximum operational 
capacity, and 29 of the prisons are so overcrowded that . . . [the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation] house[s] more than 15,000 inmates in conditions that pose substantial safety risks.”). Under the 
Government Code, a governor may call a state of emergency by  
[p]roclaim[ing the] existence of conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety of persons and 
property within the state caused by . . . conditions . . . other than conditions resulting from a labor 
controversy or conditions causing a “state of war emergency,” which, by reason of their magnitude, 
are or are likely to be beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any 
single county, city and county, or city and require the combined forces of a mutual aid region or 
regions to combat . . . . 
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8558(b) (West 2012). Note that, by its terms, Government Code section 8558(b) 
contemplates declarations of a state of emergency to respond to “conditions [such] as air pollution, fire, flood, 
storm, epidemic, riot, drought, sudden and severe energy shortage, plant or animal infestation or disease, . . . or 
volcanic prediction, or an earthquake.” Id. However, a “Governor can proclaim a state of emergency based upon 
a condition occurring in a state prison.” Cal. Corr. Peace Officers’ Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 163 Cal. App. 4th 
802, 817, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844, 854 (3d Dist. 2008). See generally id. at 818, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 855 (“[T]he 
facts presented by . . . Governor [Schwarzenegger] . . . were sufficient to establish that the prison inmate 
overcrowding occurring in October 2006 was a condition of the requisite magnitude that, if not addressed, 
would likely require the combined forces of a mutual aid region or regions to combat, i.e., would likely require 
the coordination and utilization of the multiple resources of state and local government.”). 
100. PRISON OVERCROWDING PROCLAMATION, supra note 99. The state had previously contracted “with 
four California counties to house 2,352 . . . [prisoners] in local adult jails, but this [had] create[d an] 
overcrowding problem.” Id. Namely, “[o]n a typical day, the county jails lacked space for more than 4,900 
inmates across the state. . . . 20 of California’s 58 counties ha[d] court-imposed population caps resulting from 
litigation brought by or on behalf of inmates in crowded jails and another 12 . . . ha[d] self-imposed caps.” Id.  
101. GOV’T § 15819.40 (enacted by 2007 Stat. ch. 7). 
102. TAYLOR, supra note 78, at 11.   
103. MISCZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 25; see also 2009 Cal. Stat. ch. 28 (enacting conduct credit reforms 
and non-revocable parole). For more information on non-revocable parole, see infra note 233. For a discussion 
of conduct credits, see infra text accompanying notes 272–78. 
06_FAZZI_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2013 10:12 AM 
2013 / California’s 2011 Corrections Realignment  
442 
about 214% by June 2008 and 210% by June 2009.104 However, those effects 
were apparently insufficient. On August 4, 2009, the three-judge panel convened 
by plaintiffs in Coleman and Plata found California’s prisoner medical and 
mental care violated the Federal Constitution’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause and that overcrowding was the principal cause.105  
After issuing its findings, the three-judge panel “ordered California to reduce 
its prison population to 137.5% of the prisons’ design capacity [(which, based on 
a then-design capacity of 79,858, equaled approximately 109,800 prisoners)] 
within two years.”106 The three-judge panel also established six-month population 
reduction “benchmarks” for the state to satisfy while approaching the two-year 
deadline.107 The prison population reduction order left “the choice of means to 
reduce overcrowding to the discretion of state officials. But absent compliance 
through new construction, [additional] out-of-state transfers, or other means—or 
modification of the order upon a further showing by the State—the State [would] 
be required to release some number of prisoners before their full sentences [had] 
been served.”108 The State appealed the order to the United States Supreme Court, 
and the Court stayed the order and granted certiorari.109  
d. Brown v. Plata: The United States Supreme Court Affirms the Order  
In Brown v. Plata, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the federal 
three-judge panel’s prison population reduction order by a 5–4 vote.110 Justice 
Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the Plata majority, confirmed that the state 
prison system’s medical and mental healthcare services did not satisfy the Eighth 
Amendment,111 overcrowding was the principal cause of those constitutional 
 
104. CAL. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, supra note 96, at 39. See generally id. (reporting 
California’s prison population to be 173,312 in June 2007, 170,973 in June 2008, and 167,832 in June 2009). 
105. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923–25 (2011). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VIII 
(“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.”).  
106. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1928.  
107. See Order to Reduce Prison Population, Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. Civ. S-90-0520 LKK 
JFM P, Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 TEH at 4 (E.D. Cal., N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2010) (specifying the 
six-month population-reduction benchmarks the state must meet). 
108. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1923. 
109. Id. at 1928. 
110. Adam Liptak, Justices, 5–4, Tell California to Cut Prisoner Population, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/us/24scotus.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
111. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1947 (“The medical and mental health care provided by California’s 
prisons falls below the standard of decency that inheres in the Eighth Amendment.”). See generally id. at 1924 
(“Prisoners in California with serious mental illness do not receive minimal, adequate care. Because of a 
shortage of treatment beds, suicidal inmates may be held for prolonged periods in telephone-booth sized cages 
without toilets.”); id. at 1925 (“Prisoners suffering from physical illness also receive severely deficient care. 
California’s prisons . . . have only half the clinical space needed to treat the current population. A correctional 
officer testified that, in one prison, up to 50 sick inmates may be held together in a 12-by 20-foot cage for up to 
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deficiencies,112 and “[w]ithout a reduction in overcrowding, there [would] be no 
efficacious remedy for the unconstitutional care of the sick and mentally ill in 
California’s prisons.”113 He noted, “mistaken or premature release of even one 
prisoner can cause injury and harm” and “releas[ing] . . . prisoners in large 
numbers . . . is a matter of undoubted, grave concern.”114 He also emphasized that 
the state government could satisfy the population reduction benchmarks through 
other “measures, including [conduct] credits and diversion of low-risk offenders 
and technical parole violators to community-based programs . . . .”115 However, 
he conceded “[t]he population reduction . . . required is . . . of unprecedented 
sweep and extent.”116  
3. Post-Plata, Governor Brown Contemplated Corrections Realignment as 
a Prisoner Population Reduction Measure 
The United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Plata on 
November 30, 2010, but did not decide the case until May 23rd of the following 
year.117 This means that, from January 10, 2011, the day Governor Brown first 
proposed corrections realignment to the state legislature,118 until some forty-nine 
days after he signed corrections realignment into law, the possibility existed that 
the Court would uphold the 2009 order of the federal three-judge panel directing 
California to reduce overcrowding in its prisons. But, while it must have been 
clear fairly early on in the conception of corrections realignment that rerouting 
the flow of low-level felons and parole violators from state prisons to county jails 
would help to satisfy the prison population reduction order, Governor Brown did 
not tout that potential when he urged the state legislature to adopt his plan.119  
On April 4th, when Governor Brown signed the corrections realignment 
legislation into law, he again did not assert it would reduce California’s prison 
population.120 However, he made the following declaration: “For too long, the 
state’s prison system has been a revolving door for lower-level offenders [as well 
                                                                                                                         
five hours awaiting treatment.” (citation omitted)). 
112. Id. at 1923. See generally id. at 1924 (“Overcrowding has overtaken the limited resources of prison 
staff; imposed demands well beyond the capacity of medical and mental health facilities; and created unsanitary 
and unsafe conditions that make progress in the provision of care difficult or impossible to achieve.”). 
113. Id. at 1939. 
114. Id. at 1923. 
115. Id.  
116. Id. See generally MISCZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 10 (“[T]he population in California’s . . . prisons 
. . . declined to 144,237 prisoners by the end of June 2011 . . . . The state need[ed] a further reduction of 34,433 
prisoners by June . . . 2013, to satisfy the federal court order.”). 
117. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1910. 
118. See generally BROWN, supra note 1 (proposing the budgetary realignment, and, by extension, the 
corrections realignment embodied in it, on January 10, 2011).  
119. See id. at 22–24 (summarizing the governor’s corrections realignment proposal, but not mentioning 
the legislation’s potential to reduce prison overcrowding by rerouting prisoners to jails). 
120. AB 109 Signing Message, supra note 18.  
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as] parole violators who are released within months . . . . Cycling these offenders 
through state prisons . . . aggravates crowded conditions . . . .”121 By saying that 
incarcerating low-level felons and parole violators “aggravates crowded 
conditions,”122 the governor seems to have invited the inference that corrections 
realignment would reduce the state’s prison overcrowding, at least to the extent it 
redirected those offenders to county jails. 
Then, on the day the United States Supreme Court issued its Plata opinion,123 
Governor Brown issued a press release containing the following statement: “The 
Supreme Court has upheld a lower court’s decision that California must reduce 
its prison population. In its ruling, the Supreme Court recognized that the 
enactment of [corrections realignment legislation] is key to meeting this 
obligation.”124 Governor Brown’s apparent purpose in issuing the press release 
was to generate legislative support for a constitutional amendment guaranteeing 
funding for corrections realignment notwithstanding.125 However, his assertion 
that the United States Supreme Court recognized the enactment of corrections 
realignment legislation as key to reducing California’s prison overcrowding 
suggests Governor Brown also contemplated corrections realignment to function 
as a prison population reduction measure.  
IV. THE LIKELY EFFECTS AND POSSIBLE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF THE 2011 
CORRECTIONS REALIGNMENT 
Part III established that the corrections realignment legislation was a budget 
measure. It also established that Governor Brown contemplated corrections 
realignment to reduce the state’s prison overcrowding. Part IV.A discusses the 
likely effects of corrections realignment. Part IV.B considers its possible adverse 
consequences.  
 
121. Id.  
122. Id.  
123. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
124. See Press Release, Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor Brown Issues Statement on U.S. 
Supreme Court Ruling (May 23, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
125. Governor Brown’s complete statement was as follows: “The Supreme Court has upheld a lower 
court’s decision that California must reduce its prison population. In its ruling, the Supreme Court recognized 
that the enactment of [corrections realignment] is key to meeting this obligation, We must now secure full and 
constitutionally guaranteed funding to put into effect all the realignment provisions contained in [corrections 
realignment]. As we work to carry out the Court’s ruling, I will take all steps necessary to protect public 
safety.” Id. (emphasis added). 
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A. The Likely Effects of Corrections Realignment  
1. Corrections Realignment Will Likely Generate Significant Savings for 
the State  
Governor Brown projected realigning the state’s authority over the parole 
revocations of high-level felons, over the incarceration of lower-level felons, and 
over the post-release supervision of mid-level felons to reduce state government 
expenditures by an amount growing to $1.4 billion in the 2014–15 fiscal year.126 
The Senate Budget and Fiscal Review Committee made similar projections.127 
The Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) also projected corrections realignment to 
reduce the state government’s expenditures; however, its figures suggested the 
savings will exceed Governor Brown’s projections and grow to approximately 
$1.7 billion in the 2014–15 fiscal year.128 Thus, corrections realignment will 
likely help California to realize significant future savings. 
2. Corrections Realignment Will Likely Reduce the Prisoner Population  
The corrections realignment legislation will likely help California to meet its 
legal imperative to reduce the state’s prisoner population. The CDCR estimated, 
under corrections realignment, the average daily prison population for the 2011–
12 fiscal year would “be nearly 11,000 inmates, or 7 percent[] lower . . . than it 
would have been in the absence of realignment.”129 Additionally, upon full 
implementation in “2016–17, . . . the prison population [would] be lower by 
nearly 40,000 inmates, or 24 percent, than it otherwise would have been absent 
the 2011 realignment.”130 The LAO agreed with the CDCR that realigning felons 
to local jurisdictions will reduce the prison population131 and consequently 
 
126. See supra text accompanying note 76 (reporting Governor Brown’s prediction for the savings to be 
generated by enacting corrections realignment legislation). 
127. In its final report on the budget and related legislation, the Senate Budget and Fiscal Review 
Committee predicted corrections realignment would reduce the state government’s corrections expenditures by 
an amount growing to roughly $1.3 billion in 2014–15. LENO, supra note 70, at 5-1.  
128. The LAO predicted corrections realignment would reduce the state’s expenditures by an amount 
growing to “about $1.7 billion in 2014–15,” TAYLOR, supra note 78, at 7–8, suggesting the legislation’s savings 
will exceed even the governor’s initial estimates.  
129. Id. at 6.  
130. Id. See generally id. (predicting, based on early 2012 figures, California’s “prison system . . . [will] 
have about 124,000 inmates” in the 2016–17 fiscal year). Just as an aside, corrections realignment may reduce 
the state’s female prisoner population by half, because about half of all female prisoners are low-level offenders 
by the terms of the corrections realignment legislation. Heather Tirado Gilligan, After Realignment, Fewer 
Women Expected in Prison, HEALTHYCAL.ORG (Sept. 11, 2011), http://www.healthycal.org/tag/ab-109 (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). 
131. See MAC TAYLOR, A STATUS REPORT: REDUCING PRISON OVERCROWDING IN CALIFORNIA, CAL. 
LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. 6 (2011), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2011/crim/overcrowding_080511 
.pdf [hereinafter TAYLOR, STATUS REPORT] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (projecting corrections 
realignment to alleviate prison overcrowding).  
06_FAZZI_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2013 10:12 AM 
2013 / California’s 2011 Corrections Realignment  
446 
“alleviate many of the operational challenges to the inmate medical care program 
. . . .”
132
 Corrections realignment will thus solve many of the problems underlying 
Plata; it will be “easier [under the legislation] for the [CDCR] to deliver 
adequate care to inmates who are currently receiving outpatient care at existing 
prisons . . . .”133 In addition, by the time corrections realignment is fully phased 
in, the “CDCR will be at or above the capacity needed to deliver treatment to 
most . . . mentally ill male inmates . . . .”134  
Incidentally, corrections realignment will likely shrink the state’s parolee 
number even more dramatically than it will the prisoner population.135 The LAO 
projected “the average daily parole population [in the 2011–12 fiscal year would] 
be nearly 4,300 parolees, or 5 percent lower, . . . than it would have been in the 
absence of realignment.”136 The LAO also predicted, drawing on CDCR data, 
that, “[b]y 2016–17, . . . the parole population [would] be nearly 51,000 parolees, 
or 66 percent lower, than it otherwise would have been absent the 2011 
realignment.”137 This reduction will likely lead to increased “resources in parole 
programs relative to in–prison programs after realignment.”138  
B. The Possible Adverse Effects of Corrections Realignment and Additional 
Concerns Raised by Its Enactment 
1. Reducing the Size of the Prison Population May Yield Adverse Effects  
The LAO cautioned that by reducing prisoner numbers “in low security, 
female, and reception center facilities”139 but not in high-security housing 
 
132. TAYLOR, supra note 78, at 21.  
133. Id. See generally id. (“[L]ockdowns should decline as a result of realignment, which will make it 
easier for inmates to get to their health care appointments and receive medication. In addition, reduced 
overcrowding should make it easier for [the CDCR] to hire needed medical care staff.”). The LAO also 
predicted corrections “realignment will reduce the number of new inmates arriving at reception centers from 
about 9,000 per month to about 2,400 per month, freeing up resources that would otherwise be used on inmate 
evaluations. Reduced overcrowding will also decrease the spread of infectious diseases . . . .” Id.  
134. Id. at 24.  
135. Id. at 6. 
136. Id. at 6–7. 
137. Id. at 7. See generally id. (projecting that, in 2017, the state’s parole population will stand at 
approximately 26,000). 
138. Id. at 29. Moreover, “the post–realignment inmate and parolee population will have a relatively 
higher proportion of inmates who have a lower risk to reoffend, as well as a relatively lower proportion of 
inmates who have a high risk to reoffend.” Id. 
This is likely because the inmates and parolees remaining after realignment will be relatively older 
because they are serving longer sentences because of their current or prior violent and serious 
crimes. . . . [T]he risk of reoffending decreases significantly with age. Alternatively, the inmates and 
parolees being realigned tend to be repeat offenders who regularly cycle in and out of prison and 
thus have a higher risk to reoffend on average. 
Id.  
139. Id. at 11.  
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facilities,140 corrections realignment would likely create a “mismatch between 
[cell] capacity and actual [cell] needs . . . .”141 As a result, by the 2016–17 fiscal 
year, “the state [would] have excess low–security and reception center [cells] and 
insufficient high–security” cells to accommodate state prisoners.142 In other 
words, California’s “low–security and reception center facilities . . . [will have] 
large amounts of unused space,” but its high-security prisons will continue to be 
severely overcrowded.143 The LAO also cautioned that corrections realignment 
will remove many of the felons eligible for the state’s forty-two adult fire camps 
from state custody.144 Finally, the LAO has challenged the notion that corrections 
realignment without more is sufficient to enable California to satisfy all of 
Plata’s six-month population reduction benchmarks.145  
2. Corrections Realignment May Compel Early Releases and Pose Other 
Safety Risks 
As of January 2011, “over one-third of counties [were] under court-ordered 
jail population limits” due to overcrowding,146 and in no condition to assume 
control over low-level felons realigned into their jurisdictions. If those counties’ 
 
140. See id. (“While the number of high–security inmates will also decrease under realignment, they will 
make up a smaller share of the total reduction . . . .”). 
141. Id.  
142. Id. at 11–12. See generally id. at 12 (“[T]here will be excess capacity of 6,400 beds in reception 
centers, 6,800 beds in low-security prisons, and about 2,100 excess female prison beds. Conversely, . . . there 
will be a shortage of 12,900 high-security beds.”). 
143. Id. at 11. 
144. California’s fire camp prisoner population will likely fall “to about 2,500 inmates by 2016–17, 
representing a 38 percent decline from 2010–11.” Id. at 17. Numeric losses may be offset somewhat because the 
corrections realignment legislation “authorized counties to contract for space in fire camps for offenders 
currently housed in jails.” Id. at 17.   
145. See id. at 9 (“[T]he state [will likely] miss[] the final population limit of no more than 110,000 
inmates housed in state prisons by June 2013. Specifically, . . . [it will] exceed[] this limit by about 6,000 
inmates. However, . . . the state will [likely] meet the court-imposed limit by the end of 2014.”). But see id. at 
9–10.  
[T]here is uncertainty as to whether the state will, in fact, miss those deadlines as they approach. . . . 
[The CDCR’s] longer-term projections could be either high or low depending on a variety of future 
factors, such as how successful counties are in managing their existing and realigned offender 
populations and whether there are any significant changes in judicial and prosecutorial practices that 
affect the number of offenders sentenced to state prison. 
Id. 
146. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., GOVERNOR’S REALIGNMENT PLAN—CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8 (2011), 
available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/handouts/crimjust/2011/CJ_Realignment_Plan_01_25_11.pdf (on file with 
the McGeorge Law Review). The state’s 
jails have followed a path similar to state prisons and many are crowded today. California has 480 
adult jails, although many of these are at city police stations or at short-term holding facilities near 
courts for prisoners on trial. Longer-term jails held a daily average of 73,846 prisoners in the first 
half of 2010 . . . . “Board-rated capacity,” the county jail equivalent to design capacity for state 
prisons, was 75,728 beds as of 2007.  
MISCZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 10. 
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jails are to accommodate realigned felons, they may have to release some 
misdemeanants early.147 Otherwise, they risk becoming home to just the sort of 
Eighth Amendment violations that were at the heart of the Plata controversy.148 
Early release could pose safety risks to the public.149 
Besides its potential to compel early releases, corrections realignment may 
pose safety issues for jailers and misdemeanants serving their executed jail 
sentences. While county incarceration of low-level felons seems to have been 
based on the notion that such felons “are . . . sufficiently manageable and low 
risk that they can be safely held in county jail and managed by county sheriffs,”150 
it may be “that county jail space is . . . not built or staffed to the same security 
standards required” to incarcerate felons.151 
3. Corrections Realignment May Prompt Disparate Prosecutorial Practices  
Corrections realignment may foster disparate prosecutorial practices. The 
legislation “increases the latitude of local governments to follow their own policy 
preferences” with respect to incarceration.152 This latitude is unlikely to be 
expressed in inter-county jail disparities because jailers receive standardized 
training across the state and courts regularly hear inmates’ “cruel and unusual 
 
147. Press Release, Connie Conway, Assembly Member, Cal. State Assembly, Governor Brown Signs 
Legislation to Shift Dangerous Felons to Overcrowded Local Jails or Released Early (Apr. 4, 2011) (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). Releasing jail inmates early is hardly a novel concept in California. See 
PRISON OVERCROWDING PROCLAMATION, supra note 99 (“[In 2005], 233,388 individuals statewide avoided 
incarceration or were released early into local communities because of the lack of jail space.”); MISCZYNSKI, 
supra note 3, at 10 (“In 2010, about 13,000 inmates were released early each month because of [court-ordered] 
population caps.”). Counties do have the option to contract with the state government to incarcerate jail inmates, 
but that would both frustrate the goal of alleviating prison overcrowding, Joshua Page, Guarding Against 
Reform: CA’s Corrections Officers Need to Let Some of Their Charges Go, NEW AMERICA FOUND. (May 5, 
2011), http://california.newamerica.net/node/51617 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review), and require 
counties to pay incarceration costs at the comparatively high state rate. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF CAL., 
COMMUNITY SAFETY, COMMUNITY SOLUTIONS: IMPLEMENTING AB 109: ENHANCING PUBLIC SAFETY, SAVING 
MONEY AND WISELY ALLOCATING LIMITED JAIL SPACE 5 (2011), available at http://www.aclunc.org/issues/ 
criminal_justice/asset_ upload_file464_10365.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). For a comparison 
of the state’s per-inmate incarceration costs and the counties’ per-inmate incarceration costs, see supra note 71. 
148. See Justine Sharrock, CA Not Ready to Relieve Overcrowding, CORRECTIONS.COM (June 2, 2011), 
http://www.corrections.com/news/article/28696 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting Los 
Angeles County jails, for example, already faced Eighth Amendment difficulties). 
149. See MISCZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 29 (“Corrections realignment could foster an increase in  
crime. . . . Released offenders have a fairly high likelihood of committing additional crimes after release, and 
putting them back on the streets sooner might speed up the process.”). But see id. (“However, if realigned 
corrections puts offenders under the management of local officials who have a greater stake than state prison 
employees in their rehabilitation, and if counties coordinate social service and educational programming 
effectively, the net result might be reduced crime and a reduced flow of offenders to prisons and jails overall.”). 
150. Id. at 13. 
151. Id.  
152. Id. at 25. 
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punishment” claims.153 But it may be expressed in prosecutorial practices to the 
extent prosecutors take the increased strain wrought by corrections realignment 
on their local jails’ capacities into account when deciding which felony charges 
to file against a defendant.154 Any sort of artificial “up-charging,” resulting in 
more state prison sentences, would unfairly prejudice defendants and frustrate the 
state government’s efforts to comply with the Plata prison population reduction 
order.155 
4. Corrections Realignment May Raise Equal Protection Concerns  
The corrections realignment legislation may prompt some felons and 
misdemeanants to file state and federal equal protection claims156 because the 
legislation’s changes—particularly those related to county jail sentences for low-
level felons157 and equalized conduct credit ratios for state prisoners and county 
jail inmates158—are not retroactive.159 The corrections realignment legislation may 
even prompt county correctional officers to raise equal protection claims due to 
unequal state-local law enforcement immunities.160 Finally, it is worth remarking 
that the legislation leaves felons’ voting rights unclear.161 
V. CONCLUSION 
California’s 2011 corrections realignment legislation placed felons under 
varying degrees of local control.162 It provided that county jails, rather than state 
 
153. Id. at 25–26. 
154. See id. at 26 (“[T]wo similar felons in two different counties may have very different experiences: 
One may have the misfortune to be [in a county with a jail population cap and thus be] convicted of a more 
serious crime and . . . [sentenced to] state prison [while] his counterpart in another county” without a jail 
population cap is convicted of a less serious crime and sentenced to a jail term.). 
155. TAYLOR, STATUS REPORT, supra note 131, at 6.  
156. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a) (“A person may not be . . . denied 
equal protection of the laws . . . .”). 
157. See discussion infra Appendix A (discussing felon sentencing to county jail). 
158. See infra text accompanying notes 294–95 (discussing the conduct credit earning ratio for jail 
inmates under corrections realignment). 
159. However, the California Supreme Court has already ruled equal protection concerns do not 
mandate that courts retroactively apply statutes that increase conduct credits. California v. Brown III, 278 P.3d 
1182, 1191–93 (Cal. 2012). 
160. See MISCZYNSKI, supra note 3, at 24 (“State correctional officers and parole officers have legal 
immunity when performing their official duties. For example, they cannot be sued individually if a prisoner is 
injured or if an inadequately supervised parolee commits a new crime. But local officials do not have the same 
level of protection. This could mean controversy about which level of government should properly bear the 
financial responsibility of corrections realignment litigation.”). 
161. See generally BYERS, supra note 24, at 73–77 (discussing felons’ voting rights post-realignment). 
162. See discussion supra Part II (discussing the changes wrought by the corrections realignment 
legislation); see also discussion infra Appendices A–B (discussing the corrections realignment legislation in 
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prisons, incarcerate low-level felons.163 It provided that counties, rather than the 
state, supervise mid-level felons upon their release from prison.164 Finally, it 
provided that county jails incarcerate high-level felons who violate their parole 
conditions.165 The legislation was embodied in a budgetary realignment166 and 
seems likely to function in both a budget-balancing and a prison-population-
reducing capacity.167 However, it may also lead to unintended consequences.168 
Whatever its ultimate effects, the 2011 corrections realignment marked a 
dramatic turning point in how California handles felons. Its reverberations will 
undoubtedly be felt in the state for years to come. 
  
                                                                                                                         
detail). 
163. See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (defining low-level felons and indicating corrections realignment 
required counties to incarcerate low-level felons); see also discussion infra Appendix A (discussing felon 
incarceration post-realignment).  
164. See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (defining mid-level felons and indicating corrections realignment 
required counties to supervise mid-level felons); see also discussion infra Appendix B (discussing felon post-
release supervision laws following realignment). 
165. See discussion supra Part II.B.3 (defining high-level felons and indicating corrections realignment 
required counties to incarcerate parole violators); see also discussion infra Appendix B (discussing parole 
revocation sentencing post-realignment). 
166. See discussion supra Part III.A.3 (indicating corrections realignment was embodied in California’s 
2011 corrections realignment). 
167. See discussion supra Part IV.A (indicating the likely effects of corrections realignment). 
168. See discussion supra Part IV.B (noting the possible adverse consequences of corrections 
realignment). 
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APPENDIX A: CALIFORNIA’S FELON INCARCERATION LAWS BEFORE AND AFTER 
THE 2011 CORRECTIONS REALIGNMENT 
This Appendix considers California’s felon incarceration laws before and 
after the passage of California’s 2011 corrections realignment legislation. The 
changes discussed in this Appendix functioned to reroute the flow of low-level 
felons from state prisons to county jails. 
A. California’s Felon Incarceration Laws Before Corrections Realignment 
Before corrections realignment, state law generally provided that executed 
felony sentences be served only in state prisons. This Section begins by briefly 
noting how California defines felonies. It continues by noting why different types 
of sentences pervade California’s statutes. It then outlines the state’s felony 
sentencing procedure. 
1. Felonies Defined 
Understanding felon incarceration laws in California begins with 
understanding what a felony is. Existing law defines crimes by the harshness of 
their penalties. A “felony” is by definition any crime that is punishable by a 
period of incarceration exceeding one year in length.169 Before corrections 
 
169. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 18 (West 1999) (defining felonies as offenses punishable by 
imprisonment for a minimum of sixteen months in state prison), with id. § 19 (defining misdemeanors as 
offenses punishable by terms of up to six months in county jail), and id. § 19.6 (defining infractions as offenses 
not punishable by incarceration). It should be remarked California law includes crimes—called “wobblers”—
that are presumptively felonies but which may also be punished as misdemeanors. Ewing v. California, 538 
U.S. 11, 16–17 (2003) (“[A]‘wobbler’ is presumptively a felony and ‘remains a felony except when the 
discretion is actually exercised’ to make the crime a misdemeanor. . . . [P]rosecutors may exercise their 
discretion to charge a ‘wobbler’ as either a felony or a misdemeanor. Likewise, . . . trial courts have discretion 
to reduce a ‘wobbler’ charged as a felony to a misdemeanor either before preliminary examination or at 
sentencing . . . .” (citations omitted) (quoting California v. Williams, 27 Cal. 2d 220, 229, 163 P.2d 692, 696 
(1945))); see also id. at 17 (indicating that, when deciding whether to reduce a wobbler from a felony to a 
misdemeanor, a trial “court may consider ‘those factors that direct similar sentencing decisions,’ such as ‘the 
nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant's appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, . . . 
[and] the general objectives of sentencing’” (quoting People v. Super. Ct. ex rel. Alvarez, 14 Cal. 4th 968, 978, 
928 P.2d 1171, 1177–78 (1997))). For examples of wobblers, see PENAL § 473 (West 2010) (prescribing 
“imprisonment in [a] state prison, or by imprisonment in [a] county jail for not more than one year” for 
forgery); id. § 273.5 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012) (prescribing “imprisonment in [a] state prison for two, three, or 
four years, or in a county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of up to six thousand dollars ($6,000) or 
by both that fine and imprisonment” for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or mate). Sometimes felonies that 
are not wobblers are described as “straight” felonies. See Legal Definition of a Felony in California Law, 
SHOUSE L. GRP., http://www.shouselaw.com/felony.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (“A ‘straight’ felony is one that can only be charged and sentenced as a felony.”).  
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realignment, state law provided that executed felony sentences could be served 
only in state prisons.170  
2. A Felony Sentencing System Divided Against Itself: Making Sense of the 
Mix of Indeterminate and Determinate Sentences in California Law  
Understanding the felon incarceration law in California does not end at 
knowing what a felony is. It is also important to know that two very different 
categories of felony sentences pervade existing California law. A few felony 
sentencing statutes171 prescribe open-ended sentences such as “15 years to life,”172 
affording virtually limitless sentencing flexibility. Most statutes, though, 
prescribe closed-ended sentences such as “two, three, or four years,” confining 
sentencing discretion to a universe of three choices.173 California’s felony 
sentencing system comprises both open-ended (“indeterminate”) and closed-
ended (“determinate”) prison terms because the state has had both indeterminate 
and determinate sentencing regimes in its history.  
For roughly a sixty-year stretch that began in 1917, California embraced 
indeterminate sentencing.174 Then, in 1976, California almost completely 
abandoned its indeterminate sentencing system for determinate sentencing.175 
 
170. See PENAL § 18 (West 1999) (defining felonies as offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 
one year); id. § 19.2 (providing that a county jail could incarcerate a person for only up to one year, thus 
foreclosing the possibility that felons could serve their executed felony sentences in county jails).  
171. This article uses the term “felony sentencing statute” because its references are to sentencing 
statutes, and sentencing statutes are sometimes distinct from the statutes substantively defining the underlying 
offense. Compare id. § 187 (West 2008) (defining murder), with id. § 190 (prescribing sentences for murder).  
172. See, e.g., id. § 190.05(a) (prescribing “a term of 15 years to life” for second-degree murder where 
the convicted murderer has already “served a prior prison term for murder in the first or second degree”). 
173. See, e.g., id. § 520 (West 2010) (prescribing a term of two, three, or four years for committing 
felony extortion). 
174. See 1917 Cal. Stat. ch. 527 (enacting California’s indeterminate sentencing regime); 1976 Cal. Stat. 
ch. 1139 (replacing California’s indeterminate sentencing regime with a determinate sentencing one). See 
generally PENAL § 1168 (West 2004) (codifying California’s indeterminate sentencing law); id. § 1170 (West 
2004 & Supp. 2011) (codifying California’s determinate sentencing law). The indeterminate sentencing regime 
optimized judicial sentencing discretion and incentivized prisoners’ rehabilitative efforts: 
The court imposed a statutory sentence expressed as a range between a minimum and maximum 
period of confinement—often life imprisonment—the offender must serve. An inmate’s actual 
period of incarceration within this range was under the exclusive control of the parole authority, 
which focused primarily, not on the appropriate punishment for the original offense, but on the 
offender’s progress toward rehabilitation. During most of this period, . . . prisoners had no idea when 
their confinement would end, until the moment the parole authority decided they were ready for 
release. 
In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1077, 104 P.3d 783, 790 (2005).  
175. The indeterminate sentencing system had come under political attack in the early 1970s. See 
Joaquin Palomino, How California’s Prison Population Exploded, E. BAY EXPRESS (Apr. 11, 2012), 
http://www.eastbayexpress.com/gyrobase/how-the-prison-population-exploded/Content?oid=3172693&show 
FullText=true (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“Liberals thought [the indeterminate sentencing law] 
wasn’t transparent enough; one person might serve six months for dealing drugs and another could serve a 
lifetime for the same crime. Accusations of racial discrimination and favoritism flooded the courts. 
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Today, a few remnants from the derelict indeterminate system remain. The 
sentencing statutes for a handful of serious felonies continue to prescribe 
indeterminate sentences.176 First-degree murder, to take what is perhaps the most 
obvious example, remains punishable by “a term of 25 years to life.”177 However, 
reflective of the change in sentencing regimes, the vast majority of the state’s 
felonies include sentencing “triads,”178 which comprise precise “lower, middle, 
and upper term sentence[s].”179 Thus, for example, the sentencing statute for first-
degree burglary prescribes an incarceration term of two, four, or six years.180 
Triad ranges reflect the legislatively determined seriousness of the crimes to 
which they are attached.181 Thus, felony extortion, a felony determined by the 
legislature to be relatively minor, is punishable by two, three, or four years of 
incarceration.182 Conversely, felony carjacking, a more serious felony, carries a 
sentence of three, five, or nine years.183 
  
                                                                                                                         
Conservatives . . . believ[ed indeterminate sentencing] produced lenient sentences. There also were accusations 
that the state released inmates for political and social reasons.”). The state legislature responded by enacting 
California’s determinate sentencing law. See 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1139 (enacting California’s determinate 
sentencing law). The determinate sentencing law removed judicial sentencing discretion and dis-incentivized 
prisoners’ rehabilitative efforts by  
largely abandon[ing the indeterminate sentencing] system. The [determinate sentencing law] 
implemented the Legislature’s finding that “the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment,” a 
goal “best served by terms proportionate to the seriousness of the offense,” with provision for 
sentence “uniform[ity]” for similar offenses. . . . [Under the determinate sentencing law, an] offender 
must serve [his or her] entire term, less applicable sentence credits, within prison walls, [and] then 
must be released for a further period of supervised parole.  
Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1078, 104 P.3d at 790–91 (citations omitted). 
176. After California switched to determinate sentencing, “certain serious offenders, including 
‘noncapital’ murderers (i.e., those murderers not punishable by death or life without parole), remain[ed] subject 
to indeterminate sentences. . . .” Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1078, 104 P.3d at 791. See generally CAL. LEGIS. 
ANALYST’S OFF., OVERVIEW OF CUNNINGHAM V. CALIFORNIA AND RELATED LEGISLATION 1 (2010), available 
at http://www.lao.ca.gov/handouts/crimjust/2010/Cunningham_11_9_10.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (reporting that, as of November 2010, “[a]bout 20 percent of state prison inmates [were] serving 
indeterminate life sentences”).  
177. PENAL § 190(a). 
178. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 277 (2007). See generally CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., 
supra note 176, at 1 (reporting that, as of November 2010, “[r]oughly 77 percent of state prison inmates [were] 
serving determinate sentences”). 
179. Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 277.  
180. PENAL § 461(a) (West 2010). 
181. See Dansky, supra note 80, at 67 (explaining that California’s determinate sentencing law 
categorizes “offenses . . . into [five total] degrees of seriousness . . . [and] assign[s each level] three definite 
terms (the ‘triads’)”); PENAL § 1170(a)(1) (indicating a felony’s prescribed sentencing triad reflects the state 
legislature’s assessment of that felony’s seriousness). 
182. PENAL § 520. 
183. Id. § 215(b) (West 2008). 
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3. Penal Code Section 1170: California’s Felony Sentencing Procedure 
Under the Determinate Sentencing Law 
To understand California’s felon incarceration laws, it is important to know 
how felony sentence lengths are determined. Since California uses a determinate 
sentencing system, judges adhere to the sentencing guidelines contained in Penal 
Code Section 1170—California’s determinate sentencing law (DSL)184—to 
determine the appropriate sentence to impose on convicted felons.185 Generally, a 
sentencing judge must first check whether the applicable felony sentencing 
statute prescribes a determinate sentence, an indeterminate sentence, or no 
sentence at all. If the relevant felony sentencing statute prescribes an 
indeterminate sentence length, the judge selects and imposes the appropriate 
indeterminate sentence.186 If the applicable felony sentencing statute prescribes no 
sentence at all, the judge selects and imposes the appropriate term from a range 
that includes sixteen months, two years, or three years.187  
If the applicable felony sentencing statute prescribes a determinate sentence, 
the sentencing judge must determine whether the state legislature has provided 
the felon with an alternative sentencing disposition to a prison sentence, such as 
jail or probation.188 If the state legislature has provided for an alternative 
disposition to a prison sentence, the sentencing judge imposes it.189 If, however, 
the state legislature has not provided for an alternative disposition to a prison 
sentence, the sentencing judge determines at his or her discretion which of the 
three determinate sentence lengths prescribed by the statute is the most 
appropriate to impose.190  
 
184. Id. § 1170. 
185. Id. § 1170(a). 
186. See id. § 1170(a)(3) (“Nothing in [the determinate sentencing law] shall affect any provision of law 
that . . . expressly provides for” an indeterminate sentence.); see also id. § 1168(b) (providing that, for any 
person sentenced under a statute unaffected by the determinate sentencing law, “the court imposing the sentence 
shall” provide an indeterminate sentence).  
187. See id. § 18 (“Except in cases where a different punishment is prescribed by any law of this state, 
every offense declared to be a felony, or to be punishable by imprisonment in a state prison, is punishable by 
imprisonment in any of the state prisons for 16 months, or two or three years . . . .”). 
188. See id. § 1170(a)(3) (“In any case in which the punishment prescribed by statute for a person 
convicted of a public offense is a term of imprisonment in the state prison of any specification of three time 
periods, the court shall sentence the defendant to one of the terms of imprisonment specified unless the 
convicted person is given any other disposition provided by law, including a fine, jail, probation, or the 
suspension of imposition or execution of sentence . . . .”); accord id. (“Nothing in [the determinate sentencing 
law] shall affect any provision of law . . . that authorizes or restricts the granting of probation or suspending the 
execution or imposition of sentence . . . .”). See generally id. § 1203(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011) (defining 
“probation” as “the suspension of the imposition or execution of a sentence and the order of conditional and 
revocable release in the community under the supervision of a [county] probation officer”).   
189. Id. § 1170(a)(3). 
190. See id. § 1170(b) (“When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies 
three possible terms, the choice of the appropriate term shall rest within the sound discretion of the court.”). 
This was not always the case; in its original sentencing instructions, California’s DSL directed a sentencing 
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B. California’s Felon Incarceration Laws After Corrections Realignment  
Under the 2011 corrections realignment, state law provides that executed 
sentences for certain felonies are eligible to be served in county jails. This 
Section notes how the legislation recast hundreds of non-serious, non-violent, 
and non-sexual felonies as “county jail felonies.” It then discusses how judges 
determine county jail felony sentence lengths. It moves on to a discussion of the 
county jail felony disqualifiers. This Section concludes by examining how judges 
impose county jail felony sentences.   
1. Penal Code Section 1170, Subdivision (h): Recasting Hundreds of 
Felonies as County Jail Felonies  
California’s 2011 corrections realignment legislation added subdivision (h), 
paragraphs (1) through (5), to Penal Code Section 1170—California’s 
determinate sentencing law—and then added cross-references to that new 
subdivision to about five-hundred191 statutes prescribing sentences for crimes 
deemed non-serious, non-violent, and non-sexual by the legislature. If a felony 
cross-references Penal Code Section 1170(h), it is eligible, subject to some 
disqualifiers discussed below, to be served in county jail. We may properly deem 
these felonies “county jail felonies.”192   
                                                                                                                         
judge to select the middle term of the applicable sentencing triad, unless (1) he or she found mitigating 
circumstances, in which case the sentencing judge would select the lower term, or (2) he or she found 
aggravating circumstances, in which case the sentencing judge would select the upper term. Cunningham v. 
California, 549 U.S. 270, 277 (2007). However, the United States Supreme Court ruled those instructions to be 
unconstitutional because it interpreted them to mean that the maximum allowable prison sentence in any given 
sentencing triad, as determined by the state legislature, was the middle term, and any sentence imposed above 
the maximum allowable must, in order to comport with the Sixth Amendment’s right to a trial by jury, be based 
on a jury’s findings rather than a judge’s independent determination. Id. at 293. See generally U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial[] by a[] . . . jury . . . .”). 
About “[t]wo months after the [Court’s] decision . . . , the Legislature enacted [Senate Bill 40], which . . . 
modified California’s determinate sentencing law to ensure that when there are three possible terms of 
imprisonment, the choice of the appropriate term would ‘rest within the sound discretion of the court,’” CAL. 
LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., supra note 176, at 4, thus excising any implication that the middle term is the 
maximum allowable sentence. See 2007 Cal. Stat. ch. 3 (codifying SB 40). See generally Dansky, supra note 
80, at 70 n.145 (“The California Supreme Court [subsequently] amended the Criminal Rules . . . to provide 
sentencing courts with guidance in imposing sentence.”); CAL. R. CT. 4.420 (providing the California Supreme 
Court’s amended sentencing rules).  
191. Realignment AB 109 in California, SHOUSE L. GRP., http://www.shouselaw.com/realignment.html 
(last visited Oct. 8, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
192. BYERS, supra note 24, at 10. For examples of non-serious, non-violent, and non-sexual felonies 
transformed into county jail felonies, see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2052 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) 
(prescribing sentence for unlicensed medical practice); id. § 6126 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing 
sentence for unlicensed legal practice); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 7054 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing 
sentence for using school property for political activities); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18521 (amended by 2011 Stat. 
ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for bribing electors); id. § 18680 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing 
sentence for misusing campaign funds); CAL. FIN. CODE § 3510 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing 
sentence for price fixing); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11358 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing 
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2. Penal Code Section 1170, Subdivision (h), Paragraphs (1) and (2): 
Determining County Jail Felony Sentence Lengths 
Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h), paragraphs (1) and (2), provide 
that, in general, a person sentenced on or after October 1, 2011, for committing a 
county jail felony, is eligible to serve his or her court-imposed incarceration term 
in a county jail rather than in a state prison. Pursuant to Penal Code section 
1170(h)(1), if a county jail felony’s sentencing statute does not prescribe a term 
of incarceration, the default triad range of sixteen months, two years, or three 
years applies.193 Pursuant to Penal Code section 1170(h)(2), if a county jail 
felony’s sentencing statute prescribes a triad sentencing range, the underlying 
felony is punishable by a county jail sentence for up to the length of the upper 
term.194  
                                                                                                                         
sentence for illegally cultivating marijuana); CAL. INS. CODE § 11760 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) 
(prescribing sentence for insurance fraud); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 145 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) 
(prescribing sentence for insurrection); CAL. PENAL CODE § 76 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing 
sentence for threatening elected officials); id. § 182 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for 
conspiracy); id. § 193 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for voluntary manslaughter); id. § 
237 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for false imprisonment); id. § 245(a)(1) (amended by 
2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for assault by means of force “likely to produce great bodily injury”); 
id. § 271 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for deserting a child with intent to abandon); id. 
§ 273d (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for felony child abuse); id. § 368 (amended by 
2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for crimes against elders and dependent adults); id. § 399.5 (amended 
by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for having custody of an attack dog); id. § 422.7 (amended by 2011 
Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for hate crimes); id. § 461 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing 
sentence for burglary); id. § 530.5 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for identity theft); id. § 
532f (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for mortgage fraud); id. § 597 (amended by 2011 
Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for animal cruelty); id. § 626.9 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing 
sentence for violating the Gun Free School Zone Act); id. § 631 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing 
sentence for wiretapping); id. § 664 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for criminal 
attempts); id. § 12025 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for carrying a concealed firearm); 
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5097.99 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for unlawfully 
possessing “any Native American artifacts or human remains”); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19708 (amended by 
2011 Stat. ch. 15) (prescribing sentence for tax evasion). The corrections realignment legislation amended the 
Vehicle Code to “provide[] that all felonies in the Vehicle Code that do not specify a term in state prison are” 
typically county jail felonies. BYERS, supra note 24, at 26; see also CAL. VEH. CODE § 42000 (amended by 
2011 Stat. ch. 15) (providing that Vehicle Code felonies are county jail felonies). In addition, the corrections 
realignment legislation made various conforming changes to the Penal Code, such as by amending California’s 
statutory definition of a felony to provide that the term refers, not only to offenses “punishable . . . by 
imprisonment in [a] state prison,” but also to “imprisonment in a county jail,” PENAL § 17(a) (amended by 2011 
Stat. ch. 15), and by providing that county jail sentences may exceed one year in length. Id. § 19.2 (amended by 
2011 Stat. ch. 15). 
193. PENAL § 1170(h)(1) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 
2011 Stat. ch. 136, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 361).  
194. Id. § 1170(h)(2) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011 
Stat. ch. 136, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 361). 
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3. Penal Code Section 1170, Subdivision (h), Paragraph (3): The County 
Jail Disqualifiers  
Despite the operation of Penal Code section 1170(h)(1) and (h)(2), not every 
individual sentenced for committing a county jail felony can serve his or her 
executed sentence in a county jail. Penal Code section 1170(h)(3) announces 
several county jail disqualifiers. Specifically, it indicates that any felon with a 
current or prior serious or violent felony conviction, a current or prior felony or 
misdemeanor conviction requiring registration as a sex offender, or a sentence 
enhancement based on fraud or embezzlement, is disqualified from serving his or 
her executed sentence in a county jail.195 Penal Code section 1170.1(a) establishes 
 
195. Id. § 1170(h)(3) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011 
Stat. ch. 136, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 361). See generally id. § 
1192.7(c) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011) (defining serious felonies); id. § 667.5(c)(1)–(23) (defining violent 
felonies); id. § 290 (West 2008) (specifying required sex registrants); id. § 186.11 (West 1999 & Supp. 2011) 
(describing sentence enhancements for fraud and embezzlement). Incidentally, the corrections realignment 
legislation transformed “a small number of [sex] registerable offenses, and a small number of offenses that are 
always, or almost always, serious or violent felonies” into county jail felonies; however, “those [felonies] 
remain, by operation of . . . [Penal Code section 1170](h)(3), State Prison Felonies.” BYERS, supra note 24, at 
16–17; see generally id. at 120 (noting that the corrections realignment legislation transformed Penal Code 
sections 288.2, 647.6, and 653f(c), “three mandatory [sex]-registerable offenses,” into county jail felonies); id. 
(noting that the corrections realignment legislation transformed Penal Code section 12303 and Vehicle Code 
sections 23104, 23105, and 23109.10, “felonies that are normally, or often, serious felonies,” into county jail 
felonies). Further, “a number of crimes . . . categorized as . . . non-violent, non-serious, and non-sex 
offenses . . . still require that offenders serve their sentences in State prisons. These crimes are also known as 
the Exclusions.” Public Safety Realignment, CAL. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/AB-109-crime-exclusion-list.html (last visited June 13, 2012) (on file with 
the McGeorge Law Review). “Their exclusion status is due to their enactment as majority-vote bills wherein 
voters decided that tougher and longer sentences were required for certain kinds of offenses.” Id. See generally 
Criminal Justice Realignment Will Affect Felony Sentencing, County Jail Credit, Postrelease Supervision and 
Parole, CONTINUING EDUC. OF THE BAR, http://ceb.com/lawalerts/Criminal-Justice-Realignment.asp (last 
visited June 22, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining that many of the excluded offenses 
“involve a weapon or injury”). The exclusions, as noted on the AB 109 Final Crime Exclusion List, CAL. DEP’T 
OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION (July 15, 2011), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/AB-109-final-crime-
exclusion-list.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) webpage, are as follows: ELEC. § 18501 
(prescribing sentence for being a public official who aids and abets voter fraud); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 1090, 
1097 (prescribing sentence for conflict of interest by public officer or employee); id. § 1195 (prescribing 
sentence for taking subordinate pay), id. § 1855 (prescribing sentence for destroying documents); HEALTH & 
SAFETY §§ 11353, 11354 (prescribing sentence for employing a minor to sell controlled substance); id. § 
11361(a), (b) (prescribing sentence for employing a minor to sell marijuana); id. § 11370.1 (prescribing 
sentence for possessing a controlled substance while armed with a firearm); id. § 11380(a) (prescribing sentence 
for using a minor to transport/possess/possess for sale); id. § 120291 (prescribing sentence for knowingly 
exposing someone to HIV); PENAL § 67 (prescribing sentence for bribing an executive officer); id. § 68 
(prescribing sentence for being an executive or ministerial officer and accepting a bribe); id. § 85 (prescribing 
sentence for bribing a legislator); id. § 86 (prescribing sentence for being a legislator and accepting a bribe); id. 
§§ 92–93 (prescribing sentence for judicial bribery); id. § 113 (prescribing sentence for manufacturing or 
distributing false citizenship documents); id. § 114 (prescribing sentence for using false citizenship documents); 
id. § 141 (prescribing sentence for being a peace officer and intentionally planting evidence); id. § 165 
(prescribing sentence for being a local official and accepting a bribe); id. § 186.11 (prescribing sentence for 
felony convictions with a Penal Code section 186.11 enhancement); id. § 186.22 (prescribing sentence for 
criminal gang activity); id. § 186.26 (prescribing sentence for street gang activity); id. § 186.33 (prescribing 
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an additional county jail disqualifier: if a person incurs convictions for at least 
two felonies, and one of the offenses prescribes a prison sentence, the convicted 
felon will serve an aggregate sentence196 in a prison, even if one of the other 
offenses is a county jail felony.197 
4. Penal Code Section 1170, Subdivision (h), Paragraph (5): The 
Sentencing Procedure for County Jail Felonies  
The 2011 corrections realignment legislation requires judges to determine 
whether any individual who incurs a county jail felony conviction has one of the 
                                                                                                                         
sentence for gang registration violation); id. § 191.5(c) (prescribing sentence for committing vehicular 
manslaughter while intoxicated); id. § 222 (prescribing sentence for administering stupefying drugs to assist in 
the commission of a felony); id. § 243.7 (prescribing sentence for battering a juror); id. § 243.9 (prescribing 
sentence for gassing a peace officer or local detention facility employee); id. § 245(d) (prescribing sentence for 
assaulting a peace officer); id. § 266a (prescribing sentence for abducting or procuring by fraudulent 
inducement for prostitution); id. § 266e (prescribing sentence for purchasing of a person for purposes of 
prostitution or placing a person for immoral purposes); id. § 266f (prescribing sentence for selling a person for 
immoral purposes); id. § 266h (prescribing sentence for pimping and pimping a minor); id. § 266i (prescribing 
sentence for pandering and pandering with a minor); id. § 266j (prescribing sentence for procuring a child under 
age sixteen for lewd or lascivious acts); id. § 272(b) (prescribing sentence for persuading, luring, or transporting 
a minor under thirteen); id. § 273a (prescribing sentence for felony child abuse likely to produce great bodily 
injury or death); id. § 273ab (prescribing sentence for assault resulting in death of a child under age 8); id. § 
273.5 (prescribing sentence for felony domestic violence); id. § 298.2 (prescribing sentence for knowingly 
facilitating the collection of wrongfully attributed DNA specimens); id. § 299.5 (prescribing sentence for the 
wrongful use of DNA specimens); id. § 347 (prescribing sentence for poisoning or adulterating food, drink, 
medicine, pharmaceutical product, spring, well, reservoir, or public water supply); id. § 368b (prescribing 
sentence for felony physical abuse of an elder or dependent adult); id. § 417(c) (prescribing sentence for 
brandishing a firearm in the presence of a peace officer); id. § 417.8 (prescribing sentence for brandishing a 
firearm or deadly weapon to avoid arrest); id. § 424 (prescribing sentence for misappropriating public funds); 
id. § 452 (prescribing sentence for unlawfully causing a fire that causes an inhabited structure or inhabited 
property to burn); id. §§ 504, 514 (prescribing sentence for embezzling public funds); id. § 598c (prescribing 
sentence for possessing or importing horsemeat); id. § 598d (prescribing sentence for selling horsemeat); id. § 
646.9 (prescribing sentence for felony stalking); id. § 653f(b) (prescribing sentence for solicitation for murder); 
id. §§ 12021, 12021.1 (prescribing sentence for possessing a firearm while prohibited from doing so); id. § 
12303.2 (prescribing sentence for possessing an explosive or destructive device); id. § 4532 (prescribing 
sentence for escape); VEH. § 2800.2 (prescribing sentence for evading a peace officer by driving in a willful or 
wanton disregard for safety of persons or property); id. § 2800.3 (prescribing sentence for evading a peace 
officer and causing death or serious bodily injury); id. § 20001 (prescribing sentence for hit and run driving 
causing death or injury); id. § 23153 (prescribing sentence for felony driving under the influence causing 
injury).  
196.  See generally PENAL § 1170.1(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011) (providing that an aggregate sentence 
is equal to “the sum of the principal term, the subordinate term, and any additional term imposed for applicable 
enhancements for prior convictions, prior prison terms, and” sentence enhancements); id. (providing that, in any 
aggregate prison sentence, the “principal term” is the longest imposed term, including enhancements, whereas 
the “subordinate term” is “one-third of the middle term of imprisonment prescribed for each other felony 
conviction . . . , and shall include one-third of the term imposed for any specific enhancements applicable to 
those subordinate offenses”); id. § 1170.1(d) (“If an enhancement is punishable by one of three terms, the court 
shall, in its discretion, impose the term that best serves the interest of justice, and state the reasons for its 
sentence choice on the record at the time of sentencing.”).  
197. Id. § 1170.1(a) (amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 361). 
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county jail disqualifiers.198 If the felon has a disqualifier, the judge’s task is to 
impose sentence in accordance with existing state law.199 If the felon does not 
have a jail disqualifier, the sentencing judge’s task is more involved.  
First, the judge must select and impose the appropriate term contained in the 
felony sentencing statute.200 From there, he or she has two general sentencing 
options.201 The judge can order the felon to serve the entirety of the imposed term 
of incarceration in a county jail and forego any period of post-release 
supervision.202 Alternatively, the judge can impose a “split sentence”—that is, 
impose a sentence divided into an executed and a suspended segment such that 
the felon serves a beginning part of his or her sentence in a county jail and then a 
concluding part under mandatory post-release community supervision.203 It 
appears judges opting to impose split sentences must also specify the respective 
executed and suspended sentence lengths.204 
 
  
 
198. Id. § 1170(h)(3) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011 
Stat. ch. 136, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 361). 
199. Of course, even if the felon has a disqualifier, the sentencing judge has discretion to impose a 
sentence other than a state prison term. Id. § 1170(h)(4) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. 
ch. 39, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 136, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 
361). 
200. The corrections realignment legislation retained “[t]he triad sentencing system of the Determinate 
Sentencing Law,” along with most of the triads already prescribed in the affected felonies. BYERS, supra note 
24, at 16. It thus appears to comport with existing sentencing rules. Id. at 69. 
201. PENAL § 1170(h)(5) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 
2011 Stat. ch. 136, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 361). 
202. Id. § 1170(h)(5)(A) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 
2011 Stat. ch. 136, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 361). 
203. Id. § 1170(h)(5)(B) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 
2011 Stat. ch. 136, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 361). During the 
mandatory supervision period, the supervisee cannot earn conduct credits. Id. For a discussion of conduct 
credits, see infra text accompanying notes 272–78. 
204. BYERS, supra note 24, at 37. 
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APPENDIX B: CALIFORNIA’S POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION LAWS BEFORE AND 
AFTER THE 2011 CORRECTIONS REALIGNMENT 
This Appendix considers California’s post-release supervision laws prior 
and subsequent to the passage of California’s 2011 corrections realignment 
legislation. The changes discussed in this Appendix functioned to reroute the 
post-incarceration flow of mid-level felons from state-administered parole to 
county probation. They also increased the difficulty of returning parolees to 
prison for committing parole violations.  
A. California’s Post-Release Supervision Laws Before Corrections Realignment 
Before corrections realignment, state law mandated a period of post-release 
supervision for all felons. Furthermore, the state conducted parole revocation 
hearings, and parole violators typically served their revocation sentences in state 
prison. This Section discusses the parole system, including the calculus for 
determining parole lengths. This Section also discusses parole revocation laws 
prior to the 2011 corrections realignment.  
1. Mandatory State-Administered Parole for All Felons 
Before corrections realignment, state law required all felons, after completing 
their prison sentences, to go on a period of state-administered, post-release 
supervision called “parole.”205 Under existing law, the CDCR retains legal 
custody over every felon on parole.206 A felon generally serves his or her parole 
term in the county of his or her “last legal residence . . . prior to . . . 
incarceration.”207 However, the CDCR can release the felon onto parole in a 
 
205. PENAL § 3000(a)(1) (West 2011). See generally Prison Law Office v. Koenig, 186 Cal. App. 3d 
560, 566, 233 Cal. Rptr. 590, 594 (1st Dist. 1986) (“Parole is the conditional release of a prisoner who has 
already served part of his or her state prison sentence. Once released from confinement, a prisoner on parole is 
not free from legal restraint, but is constructively a prisoner in the legal custody of state prison authorities until 
officially discharged from parole.”). But cf. PENAL § 1170(a)(3) (West Supp. 2011) (providing that, if a 
prisoner’s conduct credits equal his or her “total sentence, including both confinement time and the period of 
parole,” the prisoner will not go on parole). For a discussion of conduct credits, see infra text accompanying 
notes 272–78. 
206. PENAL § 3056 (West 2011). This means that CDCR parole officers supervise parolees. PRISON 
LAW OFFICE, THE PAROLEE RIGHTS HANDBOOK 4 (2010), available at http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/Parole 
Manual,Mar10wforms3.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). See generally Explanation of California 
Parole Law, SHOUSE L. GRP., http://www.shouselaw.com/parolehub.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2012) (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review) (indicating parole officers “report directly to the [California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation’s] Board of Parole Hearings,” “prepare plans and recommendations for 
[parolees] prior to release,” “help their parolees arrange for services such as employment, housing, medical care 
and counseling services, and social activities”); id. (indicating parole officers also conduct six types of parole 
supervision—intensive re-entry, regular re-entry, specialized caseloads, case management supervision, 
electronic supervision, and subsistence and personal care). 
207. PENAL § 3003(a).  
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different county if doing so serves the public interest.208 Once the CDCR 
determines into which county it will release a felon, it must provide specified 
information to the county’s law enforcement agencies.209 Once the CDCR 
releases a felon on parole, it may require the parolee to wear an electronic 
monitoring device210 or to be under continuous electronic monitoring.211  
2. Parole Lengths 
Under existing state law, the CDCR’s Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) 
(California’s parole authority)212 determines “[t]he length of [a person’s] parole 
 
208. Id. § 3003(b). The paroling authority must consider several factors before making its decision, 
“giving the greatest weight to the protection of the victim and the safety of the community.” Id. Those factors 
are: “[t]he need to protect [any person’s] life or safety,” id. § 3003(b)(1); “[p]ublic concern that would reduce 
the chance that the inmate's parole would be successfully completed,” id. § 3003(b)(2); “[t]he verified existence 
of a work offer, or an educational or vocational training program,” id. § 3003(b)(3); “[t]he existence of family 
in another county with whom the inmate has maintained strong ties and whose support would increase the 
chance that the inmate's parole would be successfully completed,” id. § 3003(b)(4); and “[t]he lack of necessary 
outpatient treatment programs for parolees receiving [mental health care] treatment.” Id. § 3003(b)(5). Parolees 
convicted of a violent felony defined in Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (C), paragraphs (1)–(7) and (16), 
or of a felony involving “great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice,” cannot “be returned to a 
location within 35 miles of the . . . residence of a victim of, or a witness to, [the] violent felony” whenever “the 
victim or witness . . . request[s] additional distance in the placement of [parolee], and . . . the Board of Parole 
Hearings or the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation finds that there is a need to protect the life, safety, 
or well-being of a victim or witness.” Id. § 3003(f). Similarly, parolees convicted of “an offense involving 
stalking shall not be returned to a location within 35 miles of the victim's actual residence or place of 
employment if the victim or witness has requested additional distance in the placement of the [parolee] . . . , and 
. . . the Board of Parole Hearings or the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation finds that there is a need 
to protect the life, safety, or well-being of the victim.” Id. § 3003(h). Parolees convicted of lewd or lascivious 
acts or continuous sexual abuse of a child cannot reside while on parole “within one-half mile of any public or 
private school.” Id. § 3003(g). Finally, a California felon can be paroled out-of-state. Id. § 3003(j).  
209. Id. § 3003(e)(1). Required information includes: the parolee’s name, id. § 3003(e)(1)(A); birthdate, 
id. § 3003(e)(1)(B); physical appearance, id. § 3003(e)(1)(C); starting and ending parole dates, id. § 
3003(e)(1)(D); “[r]egistration status, if . . . [the parolee must] register . . . [for having committed] a controlled 
substance, sex, or arson offense,” id. § 3003(e)(1)(E); “California Criminal Information Number, FBI number, 
social security number, and driver’s license number,” id. § 3003(e)(1)(F); county of parole, id. § 3003(e)(1)(G); 
street address, id. § 3003(e)(1)(J); supervising officer, id. § 3003(e)(1)(K); physical “scars, marks, and tattoos,” 
id. § 3003(e)(1)(H); commitment offense or offenses, id. § 3003(e)(1)(I); photograph and fingerprints, id. § 
3003(e)(1)(L); and “[a] geographic coordinate for the parolee’s residence location for use with a Geographical 
Information System (GIS) or comparable computer program.” Id. § 3003(e)(1)(M). See generally id. § 
3003(e)(2) (“The information required . . . shall come from the statewide parolee database.”); id. § 3003(e)(3) 
(“All of the information . . . shall be provided utilizing a computer-to-computer transfer in a format usable by a 
desktop computer system. The transfer of this information shall be continually available to local law 
enforcement agencies upon request.”). 
210. Id. § 3004.  
211. Id. § 3010; see also id. §§ 3010–10.9 (discussing continuous electronic monitoring and 
distinguishing a “continuous electronic monitoring device” from an “electronic monitoring device”). 
212. See generally About CDCR: Divisions and Boards: The Board of Parole Hearings (BPH), CAL. 
DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS & REHABILITATION, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/BOPH/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2012) (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“The Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) conducts parole consideration 
hearings, parole rescission hearings, parole revocation hearings and parole progress hearings for adult inmates 
and parolees under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.”). 
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period . . . [based] on the type and date of the criminal conviction for which the 
person is on parole.”213  
a. Parole Lengths for Felons Sentenced to Indeterminate Terms 
Under existing law, the parole length for a life inmate214 whose commitment 
offense215 was first- or second-degree murder is the remainder of his or her 
lifetime.216 Likewise, the parole length for a life inmate whose commitment 
offense was a specified sexual felony is the rest of his or her life.217 Before 
corrections realignment, the parole length for a person who is required to register 
as a sex offender for specific sexual felonies was twenty years.218 Under current 
law, the parole length for a life inmate is ten years with a maximum of fifteen 
years if the commitment offense was kidnapping in order to commit rape or 
 
213. PRISON LAW OFFICE, supra note 205, at 24. See generally PENAL § 3000(b)(6) (indicating the 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation computes an individual’s parole period is “from the 
date of initial parole”). If a person absconds from parole, the time he or she absconded does not count toward 
the completion of his or her parole period. See id. (“Time during which parole is suspended because the prisoner 
has absconded or has been returned to custody as a parole violator shall not be credited toward any period of 
parole unless the prisoner is found not guilty of the parole violation.”). 
214. As used in this article, the term “life inmate” simply refers to a felon sentenced to an indeterminate 
life term (for example, “twenty-five-years-to-life”). For more information on indeterminate sentences and 
sentencing, see supra note 174. 
215. As used in this article, the term “commitment offense” simply refers to the offense for which a 
convicted offender began his or her current period of institutional confinement. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
116 (3d pocket ed. 2006) (defining “commitment” as, inter alia, [t]he act of confining a person in a prison . . . 
or other institution”). 
216. PENAL § 3000.1(a)(1). But see id. § 3000.1(b) (indicating life inmates whose commitment offense 
was first-degree murder are eligible for discharge from parole after satisfactorily completing seven years of 
parole); id. (indicating life inmates whose commitment offense was second-degree murder are eligible for 
discharge from parole after completing five years of violation-free parole). Prior to corrections realignment, the 
Board of Parole Hearings had the authority to retain life inmates whose commitment offense was first- or 
second-degree murder on parole for good cause, and, if retained on parole, those life inmates had the right to a 
parole hearing—to be conducted by the Board of Parole Hearings—every year following retention. Id. 
217. PENAL § 3000.1(a)(2). See generally id. § 667.61(j)(1)–(2), (l), (m) (West Supp. 2011) (defining 
the specified sexual felonies); id. § 269 (West 2008) (defining kidnapping a minor less than fourteen years old 
with the intent to commit aggravated sexual assault); id. § 288.7 (West 2008) (defining sexual intercourse or 
sodomy with a child ten years old or younger); id. § 667.51(c) (West 2010) (defining lewd or lascivious acts or 
continuous sexual abuse of a child after having already accrued two specified sexual priors); id. § 667.71 (West 
2011) (defining “habitual sexual offender”). 
218. Id. § 3000(b)(4)(A). See generally id. § 261 (West 2008) (defining rape of child under fourteen); id. 
§ 262 (defining spousal rape); id. § 264.1 (West Supp. 2011) (defining “rape or penetration by foreign object”); 
id. § 288(a) (defining lewd or lascivious acts with a person or child “with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or 
gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or . . . child”); id. § 288(b)(1) (defining lewd or 
lascivious acts “by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on 
the victim or another person”); id. § 288.5 (West 2008) (defining continuous sexual abuse of a child); id. § 289 
(West Supp. 2011) (defining forcible acts of sexual penetration). Before corrections realignment, the Board of 
Parole Hearings could retain these sex registrants on parole for good cause. Id. If retained on parole, a sex 
registrant was entitled to a parole review hearing, conducted by the Board of Parole Hearings, each year 
following retention. Id. § 3000(b)(4)(B). 
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penetration by foreign object, lewd or lascivious acts, forcible sexual penetration, 
lewd or lascivious acts with a child under fourteen, a recidivist sex offense, or a 
habitual sex offense.219 However, before corrections realignment, these particular 
life inmates were eligible for discharge after satisfactorily completing a parole 
period of six consecutive years.220 
Under current law, the parole length for a life inmate whose commitment 
offense was “any offense other than first or second degree murder” is five years 
with a maximum of seven years.221 Finally, under current law, the parole length 
for felons sentenced to any indeterminate term other than life is three years with a 
maximum period of four years.222 
b. Parole Lengths for Felons Sentenced to Determinate Terms 
Under existing law, the parole length for most persons sentenced under 
California’s determinate sentencing law is three years with a maximum of four 
years.223 However, the parole length for persons convicted of certain violent sex 
crimes—specifically, rape,224 spousal rape,225 sodomy,226 oral copulation,227 lewd or 
 
219. Id. § 3000(b)(3), (b)(6)(C) (West 2011). See generally id. § 209(b) (West 2008) (defining 
kidnapping); id. § 264.1 (West Supp. 2011) (defining rape or penetration by foreign object); id. § 288 (defining 
lewd or lascivious acts); id. § 289 (defining forcible sexual penetration); id. § 667.51 (West 2010) (defining 
lewd or lascivious acts with a child under fourteen); id. § 667.61 (West 2011) (defining recidivist sex offenses); 
id. § 667.71 (defining habitual sex offenses). 
220. Id. § 3001(c). 
221. Id. § 3000(b)(1), (b)(6)(B). 
222. Id. § 3000(b)(1), (b)(6)(A). 
223. Id. § 3000(b)(2), (b)(6)(A). 
224. Id. § 667.5(c)(3) (West Supp. 2011). See generally id. § 261(a), (a)(2), (a)(6) (West 2008) (defining 
rape for purposes of classification as a violent sex offense). 
225. Id. § 667.5(c)(3) (West Supp. 2011). See generally id. § 262(a), (a)(1), (a)(4) (West 2008) (defining 
spousal rape for purposes of classification as a violent sex offense). 
226. Id. § 667.5(c)(4) (West Supp. 2011). See generally id. § 286(a), (c)(1), (c)(2)(A)–(C), (c)(3), 
(d)(1)–(3) (West Supp. 2012) (defining sodomy for purposes of classification as a violent sex offense). 
227. Id. § 667.5(c)(5) (West Supp. 2011). See generally id. § 288a(a), (c)(1), (c)(2)(A)–(C), (c)(3), 
(d)(1)–(3) (West Supp. 2012) (defining oral copulation for purposes of classification as a violent sex offense). 
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lascivious acts,228 sexual penetration,229 or rape, spousal rape, or sexual 
penetration, in concert230—is ten years, with a maximum of fifteen years.231  
3. Post-Release Supervision Revocation Laws 
The law prior to corrections realignment empowered the BPH to initiate and 
conduct parole proceedings232 as well as to revoke the parole terms of parolees 
whose commitment offense was violent, serious, or sexual in nature.233 Under 
prior law, whenever the BPH determined a parolee had violated the terms of his 
or her post-release supervision, it had the authority to remand the violator to state 
prison234 for a revocation sentence lasting up to one year.235 Furthermore, prior 
 
228. Id. § 667.5(c)(6) (West Supp. 2011). See generally id. § 288(a), (b)(1)–(2) (defining lewd or 
lascivious acts “upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child who is under the age of 14 
years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person 
or the child” for purposes of classification as a violent sex offense); id. § 667.5(c)(6) (defining other lewd or 
lascivious acts for purposes of classification as a violent sex offense). 
229. Id. § 667.5(c)(11). See generally id. § 289(a)(1)(A)–(C), (a)(2) (defining forcible sexual penetration 
for purposes of classification as a violent sex offense); id. § 289(a)(2) (defining violent sexual penetration 
accomplished by threatened kidnapping or false imprisonment); id. § 289(j) (defining “[a]ny person who 
participates in an act of sexual penetration with another person who is under 14 years of age and who is more 
than 10 years younger than he or she” for purposes of classification as a violent sex offense). 
230. Id. § 667.5(c)(18). See generally id. § 264.1 (defining rape, spousal rape, or sexual penetration, in 
concert, for purposes of classification as a violent sex offense). 
231. Id. § 3000(b)(2), (b)(6)(C) (West 2011). 
232. Id. § 3060. See generally id. § 3015 (requiring the Board of Parole Hearings to use an evidence-
based computer model—called a parole violation decision-making instrument—to determine how to punish 
parole violators); id. § 3015(b)(1) (indicating the model “provides ranges of appropriate sanctions for parole 
violators given relevant case factors, including, but not limited to, offense history, risk of re-offense based on a 
validated risk assessment tool, need for treatment services, the number and type of current and prior parole 
violations, and other relevant statutory requirements”). 
233. Id. § 3060. The BPH cannot revoke the parole term of any parolee whose commitment offense was 
non-serious, non-violent, and non-sexual, unless the parolee commits a new prosecutable offense. Id. § 
3000.03(a)–(c). The parolee has to satisfy other eligibility criteria to qualify for this non-revocable category of 
parole: the parolee has not been “found guilty of a serious disciplinary offense,” id. § 3000.03(d), has not 
belonged to a prison gang, id. § 3000.03(e), did not refuse to sign his or her parole agreement, id., and has been 
determined by the CDCR, “using a validated risk assessment tool,” to not “pose a high risk to reoffend,” id. § 
3000.03(g). 
234. Id. § 3060. Prior to corrections realignment, the BPH had the ability to send parole violators with 
specified drug and health needs to parole reentry courts. Id. § 3015(d). See generally id. § 3015(e)(1) (indicating 
parole reentry court programs “direct the treatment and supervision of parolees who would benefit from 
community drug treatment or mental health treatment” and utilize “close supervision and monitoring, dedicated 
calendars, nonadversarial proceedings, frequent drug and alcohol testing, and close collaboration between the 
respective entities involved to improve the parolee’s likelihood of success on parole”); id. (“Only courts with 
existing drug and mental health courts or courts that otherwise demonstrate leadership and a commitment to 
conduct the reentry court . . . may” participate as reentry courts); id. § 3015(e)(2)–(3) (requiring the Judicial 
Council to evaluate each reentry court for its “effectiveness in reducing recidivism” and presents its findings to 
the state legislature and the governor). For a definition of the Judicial Council, see infra note 259. 
235. PENAL § 3057(a). Before corrections realignment, whenever the BPH revoked a person’s parole, it 
had to hold a parole reconsideration hearing within twelve months of the original order to revoke and every year 
thereafter until either (1) it returned the prisoner to parole or (2) the prisoner lost his or her parole eligibility. Id. 
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state law gave the BPH the authority to extend an imprisoned violator’s 
revocation term any time the parole violator committed new acts of 
misconduct.236 
B. California’s Post-Release Supervision Laws After Corrections Realignment 
The corrections realignment legislation created a county-administered, post-
release supervision program and made it applicable to mid-level felons released 
from prison on or after October 1, 2011. The legislation also amended the parole 
lengths for certain sex offenders. Furthermore, it provided that California’s trial 
courts conduct parole and supervision revocation proceedings through court-
appointed revocation hearing officers, and that virtually all supervision and 
parole violators serve their revocation terms in county jails. This Section 
discusses those changes in some detail. 
1. The 2011 Post-Release Community Supervision Act: County-
Administered Supervision for Mid-Level Felons 
The 2011 corrections realignment legislation enacted the Post-Release 
Community Supervision Act of 2011.237 Under the Act, all felons released on 
parole prior to October 1, 2011 and on parole as of that date remained under state 
supervision.238 Furthermore, “high-level” felons (namely, high-risk sex offenders, 
offenders with mental disorders, and felons who served prison terms for 
committing serious or violent felonies or third strike offenses) continued to go on 
parole.239 However, felons released from prison on or after October 1, 2011, and 
who are disqualified from serving their executed felony sentences in county jail 
                                                                                                                         
§ 3000(b)(4)(C). Under prior law, unless a disqualifier applied, parole violators returned to custody could earn 
conduct credits at the same day-for-day rate state prisoners do. Id. § 3057(d)(1). But see id. § 3057(d)(2)(A)–(F) 
(noting which violators could not earn conduct credits). For a discussion of conduct credits, see infra text 
accompanying notes 272–78. 
236. Id. § 3057(c). Specifically, under prior law, the BPH could extend the revocation term by up to 180 
days for each offense prosecutable as a felony, by up to ninety days for each offense prosecutable as a 
misdemeanor, and by up to thirty days for an action defined by the [CDCR] as a serious disciplinary offense. Id. 
See generally id. § 2932(a)(1) (defining “serious disciplinary offense”). 
237. Id. § 3450 (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). 
238. Id. § 3000.09(a), (b) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011 
Stat. ch. 136, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). However, persons paroled prior to October 1 for the 
commission of a non-serious, non-violent, and non-sexual offense, and who are not classified by the California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation as high-risk sex offenders or offenders with mental disorders, are 
eligible for discharge after satisfactorily completing six months of parole. Id. § 3000.09(b)(3) (enacted by 2011 
Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 136, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. 
ch. 12). 
239. Id. § 3000.08(a)(1)–(3) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 
2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). 
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but are not high-level felons, go on county-administered, post-release supervision 
instead of state-administered parole.240  
a. Program Implementation  
Corrections realignment established that each county’s community 
corrections partnership241 had an executive committee responsible for developing 
a plan to implement the county’s post-release community supervision and 
presenting that plan to the county’s board of supervisors.242 Once a county’s 
board of supervisors adopted a post-release community supervision 
implementation plan, it designated a local agency to execute the county’s post-
release community supervision strategy.243 Reportedly, every county “designated 
[its] probation department” as the agency responsible for administering post-
release community supervision.244 Once designated, the responsible agency had to 
develop an individualized review process for each of the county’s incoming post-
release community supervision participants (“supervisees”).245  
 
240. Id. § 3451 (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39); id. § 3003(a) (amended by 
2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12).  
241. Existing law establishes a community corrections partnership within each county. CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 1230(b)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011). A county’s chief probation officer chairs its community 
corrections partnership. Id. § 1230(b)(2). The remaining members of a county’s partnership are: a superior court 
judge or a designee thereof, id. § 1230(b)(2)A); “[a] county supervisor or the chief administrative officer for the 
county or a designee of the board of supervisors,” id. § 1230(b)(2)(B); “[t]he district attorney,” id. § 
1230(b)(2)(C); “[t]he public defender,” id. § 1230(b)(2)(D); “[t]he sheriff,” id. § 1230(b)(2)(E); the police chief, 
id. § 1230(b)(2)(F); the respective heads of the county departments of social services, mental health, 
employment, id. § 1230(b)(2)(G)–(I); the respective heads of the county’s alcohol and substance abuse 
programs and office of education, id. § 1230(b)(2)(J)–(K); “[a] representative from a community-based 
organization with experience in successfully providing rehabilitative services to persons who have been 
convicted of a criminal offense,” id. § 1230(b)(2)(L); and “[a]n individual who represents the interests of 
victims,” id. § 1230(b)(2)(M). 
242. Id. § 1230.1(a), (b) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39). Each board of 
supervisors could veto the plan presented to it, but only by a four-fifths vote of its membership. Id. § 1230.1(c) 
(enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39). If a board rejected the community corrections 
partnership’s plan, “the plan [returned] to the partnership for further consideration.” Id. 
243. PENAL § 3451(a) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39). 
244. BYERS, supra note 24, at 22. 
245. PENAL § 3454(a) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–
12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). Each designated agency may determine additional conditions for each supervisee. Id. § 
3454(b) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 
12). Corrections realignment legislation provides that additional post-release community supervision 
“conditions shall be reasonably related to the underlying offense for which the offender spent time in prison, or 
to the offender’s risk of recidivism, and the offender’s criminal history.” Id. § 3454(a) (enacted by 2011 Stat. 
ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). 
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b. The Mandatory Pre-Release Agreement  
Under corrections realignment, felons eligible to go on post-release 
community supervision instead of parole must “enter into a postrelease 
community supervision agreement [with the CDCR] prior to, and as a condition 
of, their release from prison.”246 Each post-release community supervision 
agreement must contain certain specifications247 and conditions.248 Once one of 
these mid-level felons enters into a post-release community supervision 
agreement, the CDCR may release the felon into the jurisdiction of the 
administering county.249  
 
246. PENAL § 3452(a) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15).  
247. A post-release community supervision agreement must specify the supervisee’s “release date 
and . . . maximum period . . . [of] supervision,” id. § 3452(b)(1), the supervising agency’s contact information, 
id. § 3452(b)(2), and “[a]n advisement that if [the supervisee] breaks the law or violates the conditions of 
release, he or she can be incarcerated in a county jail regardless of whether or not [the district attorney files] 
new charges,” id. § 3452(b)(3).  
248. A post-release community supervision agreement must contain the following conditions: the 
supervisee must “sign and agree to the [release] conditions,” id. § 3453(a) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, 
amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12 ); “obey all laws,” id. § 3453(b); 
“report to the supervising county agency within two working days of release from” state prison, id. § 3453(c); 
follow the supervising agency’s instructions, id. § 3453(d); “report to the supervising county agency as” the 
agency requires, id. § 3453(e); “be subject to search at any time of the day or night, with or without a warrant, 
by an agent of the supervising county agency or by a peace officer,” id. § 3453(f); ”waive extradition if found 
outside the state,” id. § 3453(g); “inform the supervising county agency of [his or her] place of residence, 
employment, education, or training,” id. § 3453(h); “inform the supervising county agency of any pending or 
anticipated changes in residence, employment, education, or training,” id. § 3453(i)(1); “inform the supervising 
county agency of [any] new employment within three business days,” id. § 3453(i)(2); “immediately inform the 
supervising county agency if . . . arrested or” cited, id. § 3453(j); “obtain the permission of the supervising 
county agency to travel more than 50 miles from the person's place of residence,” id. § 3453(k); “obtain a travel 
pass from the supervising county agency before he or she may leave the county or state for more than two 
days,” id. § 3453(l); “not be in the presence of a firearm or ammunition, or any item that appears to be a firearm 
or ammunition,” id. § 3453(m); “not possess, use, or have access to any weapon listed” in specified Penal Code 
sections, id. § 3453(n); “not possess a knife with a blade longer than two inches” unless the knife is “a kitchen 
knife . . . used and kept only in the kitchen of the person's residence,” id. § 3453(o)(1)–(2); “may use a knife 
with a blade longer than two inches, if . . . required for [the supervisee’s] employment, the [supervising agency 
has approved the] use . . . in a document . . . , and the person possesses the document of approval at all times 
and makes it available for inspection,” id. § 3453(p); “agrees to waive any right to a court hearing prior to the 
imposition of a period of ‘flash incarceration’ in a county jail of not more than seven consecutive days, and not 
more than 14 aggregate days, for any violation of his or her postrelease supervision conditions,” id. § 3453(q); 
and agrees to participate in rehabilitation programming as recommended by the supervising county agency,” id. 
§ 3453(r). 
249. Id. § 3456 (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12 1st 
Ex. Sess. ch. 12); id. § 3457 (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15). Thirty days before releasing a felon onto post-
release community supervision, the CDCR must provide the administering county with specified “information 
that would otherwise be required for parolees.” Id. § 3451(c)(2) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 
Stat. ch. 39). For a discussion of what that information includes, see supra note 209. 
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c. Supervision Lengths  
Whenever a county’s probation department gains supervision authority over 
a released mid-level felon, it may discharge the felon from supervision after he or 
she successfully completes six months of supervised release in the community.250 
However, the probation department must discharge any supervisee who 
successfully completes just one year of supervised release in the community.251 In 
the event of unsuccessful portions of the supervised release, a probation 
department cannot retain a supervisee for more than three years beyond the initial 
date of the felon’s entry into the program.252 
2. Amended Parole Lengths for Specified Sex Offenders253 
Corrections realignment provides that life inmates can be discharged from 
state custody only after satisfactorily completing six years and six months of 
parole if their commitment offense was kidnapping in order to commit rape or 
penetration by foreign object, lewd or lascivious acts, forcible sexual penetration, 
lewd or lascivious acts with a child under fourteen, a recidivist sex offense, or a 
habitual sex offense.254 Furthermore, pursuant to the corrections realignment 
legislation, an individual can be discharged from state custody only after 
satisfactorily completing twenty years and six months of parole, if required to 
register as a sex offender for committing rape against a child less than fourteen 
years of age, spousal rape, rape or penetration by foreign object, lewd or 
lascivious acts “upon or with the body . . . with the intent of arousing, appealing 
to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the child,” 
committing those same lewd or lascivious acts “by use of force, violence, duress, 
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another 
 
250. Id. § 3456(a)(2) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12 
1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). 
251. Id. § 3456(a)(3) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12 
1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). 
252. Id. § 3451(a) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39). 
253. The corrections realignment legislation increased the parole period “so that the amendments to 
[the] Penal Code section [on parole] could be made with a majority vote of the Legislature, rather than the two-
thirds vote required by Jessica’s Law.” KATHRYN B. STORTON & LISA R. RODRIGUEZ, CAL. DIST. ATT’YS 
ASS’N, PROSECUTORS’ ANALYSIS OF THE 2011 CRIMINAL JUSTICE REALIGNMENT 34 (2011), available at 
http://www.cpoc.org/php/realign/ab109other/CDAARealignGuide.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). See generally Cal. Proposition 83 (2006) (enacting the “Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: 
Jessica's Law” and providing that proposed amendments to the Penal Code sections on parole require a two-
thirds vote of the state legislature to become law unless the proposed amendments increase the lengths of the 
parole periods contained in those sections). 
254. PENAL § 3001(c) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–
12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). See generally id. § 209(b) (West 2008) (defining kidnapping); id. § 264.1 (defining 
rape or penetration by foreign object); id. § 288 (defining lewd or lascivious acts); id. § 289 (defining forcible 
sexual penetration); id. § 667.51 (West 2010) (defining lewd or lascivious acts with a child under fourteen); id. 
§ 667.61 (West 2011) (defining recidivist sex offenses); id. § 667.71 (defining habitual sex offenses). 
06_FAZZI_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2013 10:12 AM 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44 
469 
person,” continuous sexual abuse of a child, or forcible acts of sexual 
penetration.255  
3. Post-Release Supervision Revocation Laws: County Jail for Violators of 
State or County Post-Release Supervision 
Under corrections realignment, California’s trial courts conduct post-release 
supervision revocation proceedings for all supervisees and (beginning July 1, 
2013) parolees256 through court-appointed revocation hearing officers.257 Most 
supervision violations are punishable only by “intermediate sanctions” authorized 
by county probation departments, “up to and including referral to a reentry 
court . . . or flash incarceration in a county jail.”258 In effect, corrections 
realignment makes it difficult to return parolees and supervisees to prison.  
 
255. Id. § 3000(b)(4)(A) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39). See generally 
id. § 261 (West 2008) (defining rape); id. § 262 (defining spousal rape); id. § 264.1 (West Supp. 2011) (defining 
“rape or penetration by foreign object”); id. § 288(a) (defining lewd or lascivious acts with a person or child 
“with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or . . . 
child”); id. § 288(b)(1) (defining lewd or lascivious acts “by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of 
immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person”); id. § 288.5 (West 2008) (defining 
continuous sexual abuse of a child); id. § 289 (West Supp. 2011) (defining forcible acts of sexual penetration).  
256. See id. § 3455 (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12 
1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12) (requiring a “revocation hearing officer” to conduct all post-release community supervision 
revocation proceedings beginning October 1, 2011); id. § 3000.08(a), (e) (2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–
12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12) (requiring California’s trial courts to hear all parole revocation proceedings beginning 
July 1, 2013). 
257. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 71622.5(b) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 39) (requiring court-appointed 
hearing officers to “make determinations at [revocation] hearings pursuant to applicable law”). The following 
individuals qualify to be hearing officers: a person who “has been an active member of the State Bar of 
California for at least 10 years continuously prior to appointment,” id. § 71622.5(c)(1)(A); a current or former 
“judge of a court of record of California within the last five years, or [any person] eligible for the assigned 
judge program,” id. § 71622.5(c)(1)(B); or a current or former “commissioner, magistrate, referee, or hearing 
officer authorized to perform the duties of a subordinate judicial officer of a court of record of California within 
the last five years.” Id. § 71622.5(c)(1)(C). A “superior court may prescribe additional minimum qualifications 
for hearing officers . . . and may prescribe mandatory training for those hearing officers in addition to any 
training and education that may be required as judges or employees of the superior court.” Id. § 71622.5(c)(2). 
Further, superior courts determine hearing officers’ appointment procedures and compensation. Id. § 
71622.5(d). A revocation hearing officer may work in multiple counties. Id. § 71622.5(e). 
258.  PENAL § 3454(b) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–
12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). See generally id. § 3450(b)(8) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011–12 1st 
Ex. Sess. ch. 12) (defining “Community-based punishment” as “evidence-based correctional sanctions and 
programming encompassing a range of custodial and noncustodial responses to criminal or noncompliant 
offender activity”); id. § 3450(b)(8)(A) (defining “flash” incarceration as “incarceration in jail for a period of 
not more than 10 days”). For a statutory definition of reentry court programs, see supra note 234. Other 
examples of intermediate sanctions besides flash incarceration include: “[i]ntensive community supervision,” 
id. § 3450(b)(8)(B); electronic home monitoring, id. § 3450(b)(8)(C); community service, id. § 3450(b)(8)(D); 
“[r]estorative justice programs, such as mandatory victim restitution and victim-offender reconciliation,” id. § 
3450(b)(8)(E); “[w]ork, training, or education in a furlough program,” id. § 3450(b)(8)(F); work release, id. § 
3450(b)(8)(G); day reporting, id. § 3450(b)(8)(H); substance abuse treatment, id. § 3450(b)(8)(I); random drug 
testing, id. § 3450(b)(8)(J); “[m]other-infant care programs,” id. § 3450(b)(8)(K); and community interventions, 
id. § 3450(b)(8)(L). 
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a. The Post-Release Supervision Revocation Process for Supervisees  
If a county’s probation department determines intermediate sanctions are 
inappropriate responses to a particular supervisee’s violations, it may petition the 
local superior court’s revocation hearing officer to begin revocation 
proceedings.259 If the hearing officer finds the supervisee violated the conditions 
of the mandatory pre-release agreement,260 the officer can sentence the supervisee 
to a county jail revocation term261 lasting up to six months.262 Alternatively, the 
revocation hearing officer can send the supervisee to an evidence-based program 
such as a reentry court.263 The hearing officer may return the supervisee to state 
prison, but only if the supervision violation is a new prosecutable offense.264 
b. The Post-Release Supervision Revocation Process for Parolees 
A parole agent or peace officer initiates the parole revocation process265 when 
he or she “has probable cause to believe that [a] parolee is violating any term or 
condition of his or her parole” and arrests the parolee.266 Corrections realignment 
encourages courts to punish parole violators through intermediate sanctions.267 
However, if the CDCR determines intermediate sanctions are insufficient, it can 
petition the local court’s revocation hearing officer to bring revocation 
proceedings against a parolee.268 If a hearing officer finds a parolee has violated 
 
259. Id. § 3455(a) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12 1st 
Ex. Sess. ch. 12). Corrections realignment legislation directed the Judicial Council to “adopt forms and rules of 
court to establish uniform statewide procedures to implement” post-release community supervision revocation 
proceedings. Id. Accordingly, “The Judicial Council . . . promulgated, effective October 28, 2011, new rules 
(4.540 and 4.541) and a form (CR-300) for revocation of postrelease community supervision.” BYERS, supra 
note 24, at 22. See generally Judicial Council, CAL. CTS.: THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF CAL., 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/policyadmin-jc.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (“The Judicial Council is the policymaking body of the California courts . . . . Under the leadership of 
the Chief Justice and in accordance with the California Constitution, the council is responsible for ensuring the 
consistent, independent, impartial, and accessible administration of justice.”); Judicial Council Members, CAL. 
CTS.: THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF CAL., http://www.courts.ca.gov/4645.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing the current membership of the Judicial Council). 
260. For a discussion of the supervision agreement’s statutorily-mandated conditions, see supra note 
248. 
261. PENAL § 3455(a)(2) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 
2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). 
262. Id. § 3000.08(f)(2), (g) (enacted by Chapter 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12).  
263. Id. § 3455(a)(3) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12 
1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12); id. § 3000.08(f)(3) (enacted by 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). For a 
statutory definition of reentry court programs, see supra note 234. 
264. PENAL § 3458 (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15). 
265. Id. § 3000.08(c) (enacted by Chapter 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). 
266. Id.  
267. Id. § 3000.08(d) (enacted by Chapter 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). 
268. Id. § 3000.08(f) (enacted by Chapter 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). See generally 
id. (indicating the “parolee may waive . . . his or her right to counsel, admit the parole violation, waive a court 
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the conditions of his or her parole, the officer may sentence the parolee to a 
revocation term in county jail,269 but only for up to 180 days.270 Alternatively, the 
officer may refer the violator to an evidence-based program, such as a reentry 
court.271  
 
  
                                                                                                                         
hearing, and accept the proposed parole modification”). 
269. Id. § 3455(a)(2) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12 
1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). 
270. Id. § 3000.08(f)(2), (g) (enacted by Chapter 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12).  
271. Id. § 3455(a)(3) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12 
1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12); id. § 3000.08(f)(3) (enacted by Chapter 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12).  
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APPENDIX C: CALIFORNIA’S EARLY RELEASE AND ALTERNATIVE CUSTODY 
LAWS BEFORE AND AFTER THE 2011 CORRECTIONS REALIGNMENT 
This Appendix considers California’s early release and alternative custody 
laws prior and subsequent to the passage of California’s 2011 corrections 
realignment legislation. The legal changes described in this Appendix increased 
some jail inmates’ chances to procure early release and alternative custody. 
A. California’s Early Release and Alternative Custody Laws Before Corrections 
Realignment 
Before corrections realignment, conduct credits were calculated at different 
rates for state prisoners and jail inmates. Additionally, electronic home 
monitoring was available for only some jail inmates. This Section discusses the 
laws on those matters in some depth. 
1. Early Release: Unequal Conduct Credit Rates for Felons and 
Misdemeanants 
California’s criminal law provides that the CDCR awards sentence reduction 
credits—alternately called “good time credits” or “worktime credits”272—to state 
prisoners convicted under California’s determinate sentencing law on the basis of 
the prisoners’ conduct.273 Under existing law, state prisoners serving determinate 
sentences are eligible to reduce their sentence lengths by up to one-half through 
accumulation of such conduct credits274 for “any period of imprisonment prior to 
release on parole and any period of imprisonment and parole,”275 including the 
time spent housed in a county jail while awaiting transfer to state prison.276 In 
other words, felons may become eligible for release after serving as little as fifty 
 
272. Explanation of California Parole Law, supra note 206. 
273. PENAL § 2933(a) (West 2011). But cf. LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, SOLVING CALIFORNIA’S 
CORRECTIONS CRISIS: TIME IS RUNNING OUT 25–26 (2007), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhc/ 
185/Report185.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“[Conduct] credit . . . is used more as a population 
management tool than an incentive for anything other than staying out of trouble. [Conduct] credits are not 
awarded for achieving a goal, they are given to any offender who works to keep the prison running or who signs 
up for a program—even if they are just on a waiting list.”).  
274. See PENAL § 2933(b) (“For every six months of continuous incarceration, a prisoner shall be 
awarded [six months’ worth of] credit reductions from his or her [total] term of confinement . . . .”).  
275. Id. § 2900.5(c).  
276. Id. § 4019(a)(4); accord id. § 1170(a)(3) (explaining that if a convicted felon’s pre-imprisonment 
conduct credit equals or exceeds his or her court-imposed sentence, existing state law deems the felon’s entire 
sentence served). But see id. § 1170(a)(3) (requiring a felony sentence to count as a separate prior prison term 
for future sentencing purposes even if the felon does not serve any of that sentence in a state prison). See 
generally id. § 667.5 (detailing how a court imposes an “[e]nhancement of prison terms for new offenses 
because of prior prison terms”). 
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percent of their prison sentences.277 Misdemeanants in California may also reduce 
the lengths of their county jail sentences by accruing conduct credits.278 However, 
before the 2011 corrections realignment, they had to serve at least two-thirds of 
their sentences before they became eligible for release.279  
2. Alternative Custody: Electronic Home Monitoring Available for Some 
County Jail Inmates 
A county correctional administrator280 may offer a supervised, voluntary 
electronic-home-detention program281 to “minimum security” misdemeanants,282 
probationers, and persons “participating in a work furlough program” in lieu of 
being held in jail or serving on probation.283 Misdemeanants who are not 
“minimum security” may also be placed on involuntary electronic home 
 
277.  However, felons required to register as sex offenders, committed for a serious felony, or with a 
prior conviction for a serious or violent felony, must serve at least two-thirds of their sentences before becoming 
eligible for release onto parole, Id. § 2933(e)(3), and prisoners convicted of committing a violent felony offense 
must serve at least 85% of their sentences. Id. § 2933.1(a). Furthermore, each of the following types of felons 
must serve their sentences completely before becoming eligible for parole: murderers, id. § 2933.2(a); see also 
id. § 187(a) (defining murder), certain third strikers, id. § 2933.5(a)(1); see also id. § 2933.5(a)(1) (West 2011) 
(defining third strikers), and prisoners committed by the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation to security housing, psychiatric services, behavioral management, or administrative segregation 
for specified acts of misconduct, id. § 2933.6(a). A few kinds of state prisoners are eligible for enhanced 
conduct credit. For example, prisoners who complete certain rehabilitative programming performance 
objectives may earn additional conduct credits of up to six weeks per each twelve-month period of continuous 
incarceration. Id. § 2933.05(a). See generally id. § 2933.05(c) (noting “approved rehabilitation programming” 
includes “academic programs, vocational programs, vocational training, and core programs such as anger 
management and social life skills, and substance abuse programs.”). Heroic prisoners and inmate firefighters 
may also earn conduct credit enhancements. See id. § 2935(a), (b) (indicating a prisoner may gain a year’s 
worth of conduct credits for performing an act of heroism); id. § 2933.3 (indicating inmate firefighters may earn 
two days of credit for every day on assignment or following training for assignment). See generally TAYLOR, 
supra note 78, at 17 (Inmate firefighters “carry out fire suppression work and respond to other emergencies, 
such as floods and earthquakes. . . . [and] work on conservation projects on public lands and provide labor on 
local community services projects.”). 
278. PENAL § 4019. 
279. See id. § 4019(f) (providing that, for every six-day period, a jail inmate could earn one day off his 
or her sentence for good behavior and another day off for satisfactorily performing assigned labor). 
280. See id. § 1203.018(k)(1) (West 2012) (“‘Correctional administrator’ means the sheriff, probation 
officer, or director of the county department of correction.”). 
281. See id. § 1203.018(k)(2) (“‘Electronic monitoring program’ includes . . . home detention 
programs . . . .”). 
282. See generally id. § 1203.016(h)(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010) (defining a “minimum security 
inmate” as one who is eligible under Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations for Type IV local detention, 
classifiable . . . as a minimum security risk, or eligible “for placement into the community for work or school 
activities . . . .”). 
283. Id. § 1203.016(a); see also id. § 1203.016(e) (indicating “court[s] may recommend or refer a person 
. . . for placement in the home detention program,” as well as “restrict or deny the defendant’s participation 
in . . . [the] program”). 
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detention,284 but only under the supervision of a designated peace officer and 
when doing so is necessary to alleviate or avert jail overcrowding.285  
Under existing law, each person who voluntarily enters an electronic-home-
monitoring program must enter into a written agreement promising to comply 
with the program’s rules.286 Persons who involuntarily enter electronic-home-
detention programs do not enter into written agreements; instead, a county’s 
board of supervisors notifies each involuntary home detainee in writing that the 
detainee must adhere to the rules of the electronic home detention program.287 All 
home detainees must “remain within the interior premises of [their] residence[s] 
during [designated] . . . hours . . . .”288 Home detainees may, however, seek work, 
work training, medical care, and dental care with their respective correctional 
administrators’ permission.289  
A voluntary home detainee must permit the designated supervising agent to 
enter the detainee’s residence at any time in order to verify the detainee’s 
compliance with the rules of the home detention program.290 Likewise, an 
involuntary home detainee must permit the designated supervising peace officer 
to enter the detainee’s residence at any time to verify the detainee’s compliance 
with the rules of the home detention program.291 All home detainees must permit 
electronic monitoring “to verify [their] compliance with [home detention] rules 
and regulations.”292 A correctional administrator or a peace officer acting under 
the correctional administrator’s direction may, without a court order or arrest 
warrant, return any home detainee to county custody if the detainee’s electronic 
monitoring device fails or if the detainee willfully deviates from the home 
detention program’s rules.293  
  
 
284. Id. § 1203.017(a). “Involuntary” home detention is distinguishable from voluntary home detention 
in that a correctional administrator places an inmate in a home detention program without seeking the inmate’s 
consent to be placed there. Id. §§ 1203.017(c), 1203.016(b)(2). 
285. See id. § 1203.017(a) (indicating a “correctional administrator [must determine] that conditions in a 
jail facility warrant the necessity of releasing sentenced misdemeanor inmates prior to them serving the full 
amount of a given sentence due to lack of jail space” before placing a misdemeanant on involuntary electronic 
home detention). 
286. Id. § 1203.016(b), (b)(3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011). A county’s board of supervisors prescribes the 
rules of home detention in that county, id. § 1203.016(b), and may charge a voluntary home detainee a fee 
(limited to the detainee’s ability to pay) for the voluntary home detention program’s costs. Id. § 1203.016(g).  
287. Id. § 1203.017(b). A county’s board of supervisors prescribes the rules of involuntary home 
detention in that county, id., and may not charge an involuntary home detainee a fee for the program’s costs. Id. 
§ 1203.017(j).  
288. Id. §§ 1203.016(b)(1), 1203.017(b)(1). 
289. Id. §§ 1203.016(f), 1203.017(f). 
290. Id. § 1203.016(b)(2). 
291. Id. § 1203.017(b)(2). 
292. Id. §§ 1203.016(b)(3), 1203.017(b)(3). 
293. Id. §§ 1203.015(b)(4), (c), 1203.017(b)(4), (c). 
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B. California’s Early Release and Alternative Custody Laws After Corrections 
Realignment  
California’s 2011 corrections realignment legislation equalized the conduct 
credit earning rate for state prisoners and jail inmates and made electronic home 
monitoring available to all jail inmates.  
1. Early Release: Equal Conduct Credit Rates for All State Prisoners and 
Jail Inmates  
The corrections realignment legislation made the conduct credit ratio that 
applies to prison inmates applicable to all county jail inmates, including realigned 
felons and misdemeanants.294 Thus, as of the legislation’s effective date of 
October 1, 2011, any person sentenced to a county jail term is eligible to reduce 
his or her incarceration term by up to one-half by accruing conduct credits.295  
2. Alternative Custody: Electronic Home Monitoring Available for All 
County Jail Inmates 
Under corrections realignment, a correctional administrator may offer 
voluntary electronic home detention to any jail inmate.296 Further, a correctional 
administrator may place any jail inmate in an involuntary electronic home 
detention program.297 And correctional administrators may offer supervised 
electronic home monitoring, in lieu of bail, to minimum security, pre-trial jail 
inmates.298 Under corrections realignment, voluntary and involuntary home 
detainees are eligible to earn day-for-day conduct credits while in a voluntary or 
 
294. Compare id. § 4019 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 
2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12), with id. § 2933 (West 2011) (describing the conduct credit program for prison 
inmates).  
295. See id. § 4019(b), (c) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 
2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12) (providing that “for each four-day period” in confinement, a jail inmate can earn 
one day of credit for good behavior and one day of credit for performing assigned labor). 
296. Id. § 1203.016(a) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15). 
297. Id.  
298. Id. § 1203.018(b) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15; amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39). The inmate 
“must . . . [have] no holds or outstanding warrants,” id. at (c)(1), and a magistrate must approve the electronic 
monitoring release, or “[t]he inmate. . . [must be] held in custody for at least 30 calendar days from the date of 
arraignment pending disposition of only misdemeanor charges,” id. § 1203.018 (c)(1)(A), or “[t]he inmate . . . 
[must be] held in custody pending disposition of charges for at least 60 calendar days from the date of 
arraignment.” Id. § 12308(c)(1)(B) (enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15; amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39). The rules 
applicable to voluntary home detainees, see supra text accompanying notes 288–93, also apply to minimum 
security, pre-trial jail inmates on supervised, electronic home detention. See PENAL § 12308(d)(1)–(4), (f), (h) 
(enacted by 2011 Stat. ch. 15; amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39) (providing applicable home detention rules). 
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involuntary electronic home detention program, meaning they can reduce their 
supervised, electronic home detention sentences by up to one-half.299 
  
 
299. PENAL § 2900.5(a) (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15); id. § 4019 (amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 15, 
amended by 2011 Stat. ch. 39, amended by 2011–12 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 12). Prior to corrections realignment, the 
Penal Code did not refer to home detainees in its enumeration of offenders eligible to earn conduct credits. See 
id. § 2900.5(a) (West 2011) (indicating conduct credit-eligible custody includes “any time spent in a jail, camp, 
work furlough facility, halfway house, rehabilitation facility, hospital, prison, juvenile detention facility, or 
similar residential institution”). See generally STORTON & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 253, at 21 (reporting the 
legislature removed home detention from conduct credit consideration “approximately 20 years ago”). 
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APPENDIX D: CODE SECTIONS AFFECTED BY THE 2011 CORRECTIONS 
REALIGNMENT 
Code Sections Affected 
Business and Professions Code §§ 585, 650, 654.1, 655.5, 729, 1282.3, 
1701, 1701.1, 1960, 2052, 2315, 4324, 5536.5, 6126, 6153, 6788, 
7028.16, 7739, 10238.6, 11020, 11023, 11286, 11287, 11320, 16755, 
17511.9, 17550.19, 22430, 25618 (amended); Civil Code §§ 892, 
1695.8, 1812.125, 1812.217, 2945.7, 2985.2, 2985.3 (amended); 
Corporations Code §§ 2255, 2256, 6811, 6814, 8812, 8815, 12672, 
12675, 22002, 25540, 27202, 28880, 29102, 29550, 31410, 31411, 
35301 (amended); Education Code § 7054 (amended); Elections Code 
§§ 18002, 18100, 18101, 18102, 18106, 18200, 18201, 18203, 18204, 
18205, 18310, 18311, 18400, 18403, 18502, 18520, 18521, 18522, 
18523, 18524, 18540, 18544, 18545, 18560, 18561, 18564, 18566, 
18567, 18568, 18573, 18575, 18578, 18611, 18613, 18614, 18620, 
18621, 18640, 18660, 18661, 18680 (amended); Financial Code §§ 
3510, 3532, 5300, 5302, 5303, 5304, 5305, 5307, 10004, 12102, 14752, 
17700, 18349.5, 18435, 22753, 22780, 31880, 50500 (amended); Fish 
and Game Code §§ 12004, 12005 (amended); Food and Agriculture 
Code §§ 17701, 18932, 18933, 19440, 19441, 80174 (amended); 
Government Code §§ 1195, 1368, 1369, 3108, 3109, 5954, 6200, 6201, 
9056, 27443, 51018.7 (amended); Harbors and Navigation Code §§ 264, 
310, 668 (amended); Health and Safety Code §§ 1390, 1522.01, 1621.5, 
7051, 7051.5, 8113.5, 8785, 11100, 11100.1, 11105, 11153, 11153.5, 
11162.5, 11350, 11351, 11351.5, 11352, 11353.5, 11353.6, 11353.7, 
11356, 11357, 11358, 11359, 11360, 11362, 11366.5, 11366.6, 11366.8, 
11370.6, 11371, 11371.1, 11374.5, 11377, 11378, 11378.5, 11379, 
11379.5, 11379.6, 11380.7, 11381, 11383, 11383.5, 11383.6, 11383.7, 
12401, 12700, 17061, 18124.5, 25180.7, 25189.5, 25189.6, 25189.7, 
25190, 25191, 25395.13, 25515, 25541, 42400.3, 44209, 100895, 
109335, 115215, 116730, 116750, 118340, 131130 (amended); 
Insurance Code §§ 700, 750, 833, 1043, 1215.10, 1764.7, 1814, 1871.4, 
10192.165, 11161, 11162, 11163, 11760, 11880, 12660, 12845 
(amended); Labor Code §§ 227, 6425, 7771 (amended); Military and 
Veterans Code §§ 145, 1318, 1672, 1673 (amended); Penal Code §§ 
17.5, 1203.018, 1230.1, 2057, 3000.08, 3000.09, 3450, 3451, 3452, 
3453, 3454, 3455, 3456, 3457, 3458 (new), §§ 17, 18, 19.2, 33, 38, 
67.5, 69, 71, 72, 72.5, 76, 95, 95.1, 96, 99, 107, 109, 113, 114, 115.1, 
126, 136.7, 137, 139, 140, 142, 146a, 146e, 148, 148.1, 148.3, 148.4, 
148.10, 149, 153, 156, 157, 168, 171c, 171d, 181, 182, 186.10, 186.22, 
186.26, 186.28, 186.33, 191.5, 193, 193.5, 210.5, 217.1, 218.1, 219.1, 
222, 237, 241.1, 241.4, 241.7, 243, 243.1, 243.6, 244.5, 245, 245.6, 
246.3, 247.5, 261.5, 265, 266b, 266e, 266f, 266g, 271, 271a, 273.4, 
273.6, 273.65, 273d, 278, 278.5, 280, 284, 288.2, 290.018, 290.4, 
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290.45, 290.46, 298.2, 299.5, 311.9, 313.4, 337.3, 337.7, 337b, 337c, 
337d, 337e, 337f, 350, 367f, 367g, 368, 374.2, 374.8, 375, 382.5, 382.6, 
386, 387, 399.5, 404.6, 405b, 417, 417.3, 417.6, 422, 422.7, 453, 455, 
461, 463, 464, 470a, 470b, 473, 474, 478, 479, 480, 481, 483.5, 484b, 
484i, 487b, 487d, 489, 496, 496a, 496d, 499c, 499d, 500, 502, 506b, 
520, 529, 529a, 530.5, 532a, 532f, 533, 535, 537e, 538.5, 548, 549, 550, 
551, 560, 560.4, 566, 570, 577, 578, 580, 581, 587, 587.1, 591, 593, 
594, 594.3, 594.35, 594.4, 597, 597.5, 598c, 598d, 600, 601, 610, 617, 
620, 621, 625b, 626.9, 626.95, 626.10, 629.84, 631, 636, 637, 647.6, 
653f, 653h, 653j, 653s, 653t, 653u, 653w, 664, 666, 666.5, 667.5, 668, 
800, 801, 803, 836.6, 1168, 1170, 1174.4, 1203.016, 1208.2, 1213, 
1320, 1320.5, 2600, 2650, 2772, 2790, 2900.5, 2932, 3000, 3000.1, 
3001, 3003, 3056, 3057, 4011.7, 4016.5, 4019, 4131.5, 4501.1, 4502, 
4530, 4532, 4533, 4536, 4550, 4573, 4573.6, 4573.9, 4574, 4600, 
11411, 11413, 11418, 11419, 12021, 12021.1, 12021.5, 12022, 12022.5, 
12022.9, 12025, 12035, 12040, 12072, 12076, 12090, 12101, 12220, 
12280, 12281, 12303.3, 12303.6, 12304, 12312, 12320, 12355, 12370, 
12403.7, 12422, 12520, 18715, 18720, 18725, 18730, 18735, 18740, 
20110, 22810, 22910, 23900, 25110, 25300, 25400, 25850, 27590, 
28250, 29700, 30315, 30600, 30605, 30725, 31360, 32625, 33410 
(amended), §§ 3060, 3061 (repealed); Public Contract Code §§ 10283, 
10873 (amended); Public Resources Code §§ 5097.99, 14591, 25205, 
48680 (amended); Public Utilities Code §§ 7680, 7724, 7903, 21407.6 
(amended); Revenue and Taxation Code §§ 7093.6, 9278, 14521, 
16910, 18631.7, 19705, 19708, 30459.15, 32471.5, 32555, 38800, 
40211.5, 41171.5, 43522.5, 43606, 45867.5, 45955, 46628, 46705, 
50156.18, 55332.5, 55363, 60637 (amended); Vehicle Code §§ 2478, 
2800.4, 4463, 10501, 10752, 10801, 10802, 10803, 10851, 21464, 
21651, 23104, 23105, 23109, 23109.1, 23110, 23550, 42000 (amended); 
Water Code § 13387 (amended); Welfare and Institutions Code § 
1710.5 (new), §§ 871.5, 1001.5, 1731.5, 1768.7, 1768.85, 3002, 7326, 
8100, 8101, 8103, 10980, 14107.2, 14107.3, 14107.4, 17410 (amended). 
AB 109 (Committee on Budget); 2011 STAT. Ch. 15. 
Government Code § 71622.5 (new); Health and Safety Code §§ 11356, 
11381, 115215 (amended); Penal Code § 3000.08 (amended, repealed, 
and new), § 3073.1 (new), §§ 17.5, 186.22, 186.26, 186.33, 245, 273.4, 
290.018, 298.2, 299.5, 422, 455, 598c, 598d, 600, 666, 667.5, 800, 
1170, 1170.1, 1203.018, 1230, 1230.1, 2057, 2932, 3000, 3000.09, 
3000.1, 3001, 3003, 3015, 3056, 3057, 3451, 3453, 3454, 3455, 3456, 
4011.10, 4016.5, 4019, 11418, 12021.5, 12022, 12022.5, 12022.9, 
12025 (amended), §§ 3060, 4115.55 (new and repealed), § 830.5 
(amended and repealed); Vehicle Code §§ 23109, 23110 (amended); 
Welfare and Institutions Code § 1766.01 (amended), § 1710.5 
(repealed); 2011 STAT. Ch. 15 § 636 (amended). 
AB 117 (Committee on Budget); 2011 STAT. Ch. 39. 
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Penal Code heading of Title 4.5 (commencing with § 13600) of Part 4 
(amended and new), §§ 13600, 13601, 13602, 13603, 13800, 13812 
(repealed and new), 830.5, 1170, 3000.08, 3000.09 (amended), §§ 
13810, 13811, 13813 (new and repealed); Welfare and Institutions Code 
§ 1731.5 (amended); Senate Bill 92 of the 2011–12 Regular Session § 
83 (amended); Assembly Bill 117 of the 2011–12 Regular Session § 69 
(amended). 
AB 116 (Committee on Budget); 2011 STAT. Ch. 136. 
Government Code §§ 26605, 30025 (amended); Health and Safety 
Code§§ 11355, 11382 (amended); Penal Code § 2932 (repealed and 
new), §§ 1233.15, 3460, 3465, 4019.2, 4115.56 (new), §§ 17, 18, 273d, 
667.5, 800, 1170, 1170.1, 2933, 3000.08, 3000.09, 3001, 3003, 3056, 
3057, 3060.7, 3067, 3073.1, 3450, 3453, 3454, 3455, 3456, 4000, 4019, 
4501.1, 4530, 12021.5, 12025 (amended); 2011 STAT. Ch. 136 § 9 
(amended), 2011 STAT. Ch. 33 § 2.00 Item 5225-007-0001 (amended). 
ABX1 17 (Blumenfield); 2011 STAT. Ch. 12. 
 
